📚 Korean Financials Capital-Buyback Compounding Series — Part 5/N. Previous installments:

• Part 1 — Meritz Financial Holdings
• Part 2 — Kiwoom Securities
• Part 3 — KB Financial Group
• Part 4 — Shinhan Financial: Transit Between Peaks

Series Parts 1–3 framed Meritz, Kiwoom, and KB as three coexisting peaks. Part 4 traced Shinhan’s “transit between peaks” toward KB’s coordinate. Part 5’s Korea Investment Holdings is a different landscape entirely — it doesn’t cleanly map onto any of the four existing coordinates. Its ROE, PBR, foreign ownership, and payout ratio all sit differently from Meritz, Kiwoom, KB, and Shinhan. Yet its equity ₩12.1T → short-term-notes ₩21.5T → IMA ₩1.9T → combined funding capacity ₩36.3T “capital-operations platform” structure is uniquely its own. For the first time in this series, we look at a company that isn’t a follower of an existing peak — but a candidate defining its own coordinate.

Executive Summary

• Korea Investment Holdings doesn’t map cleanly onto any of the four existing series peaks. ROE 18.5% sits below Meritz’s 22.4%, PBR 1.07× below Kiwoom’s 1.39×, and foreign ownership 36.7% is less than half of KB’s 75.72%. But the “funding → asset-creation → operations” capital flywheel — short-term notes (발행어음) ₩21.48T + IMA ₩1.89T + IB ₩705.2B + asset-management ₩1.27T — is structurally absent from every other company in the series.
• The company defines itself as “Korea’s only investment-bank-centric financial holding company.” If Kiwoom is “ROE × trading-volume beta” (dynamic), Korea Investment Holdings is “ROE × funding capacity × asset-creation capability” — a capital-operations platform model. The accounting essence is simple: every ₩1T of additional equity expands funding capacity by ₩3T.
• Implied cost of equity makes the position concrete. ROE 18.5% / PBR 1.07× = 17.3%. Higher than Meritz (11.5%), Kiwoom (14.9%), KB (11.9%), and Shinhan (15.3%). The most conservatively priced of all five companies. In the same ROE category, Korea Investment receives a cost of equity 5.8 pp above Meritz.
• That 5.8 pp gap quantitatively decomposes into 5 discount factors. Trading-P&L volatility (~1.5 pp) + insurance-M&A possibility (~0.8 pp) + savings-bank/capital provisioning (~1.0 pp) + governance discount (~1.5 pp) + weak shareholder-return policy (~1.0 pp) ≈ 5.8 pp. Not coincidence — the accounting consequence of a company that doesn’t fit any category the market already classifies cleanly.
• The speed at which the new coordinate gets recognized is determined by two self-stabilization mechanisms. First, governance — separation of CEO and Board Chair, and a roadmap for cancelling the 5.4% treasury shares. Second, shareholder return — explicit total-shareholder-return ratio of 30%+. When both mechanisms operate, cost of equity narrows naturally to 14–15%. That’s why Korea Investment Holdings matters in this series.

1. Bottom Line First — The Series’ Reach into “New Coordinate” Chapter

1.1 Full Map of All Five Series Companies

Pulling every coordinate the series has visited so far into a single table:

Single-line read: Korea Investment Holdings doesn’t map cleanly onto any of the four existing coordinates. If Part 4’s Shinhan was a “follower transiting toward an existing peak,” Part 5’s Korea Investment is the first case of a company that isn’t moving toward any peak — but defining its own coordinate.

1.2 Korea Investment Holdings in One Table

Verifications:

• 2026E PBR = 240,000 / 224,562 = 1.069× ≈ 1.07× ✓
• 2026E PER = 240,000 / 36,234 = 6.624× ≈ 6.62× ✓
• Implied cost of equity = 18.5 / 1.07 = 17.29% ≈ 17.3% ✓
• Distance from high = 240,000/300,500 − 1 = -20.13% ≈ -20.1% ✓
• DPS growth = 8,690/3,980 − 1 = +118.34% ≈ +118.3% ✓
• Payout ratio = 507.8/2,020.4 = 25.13% ≈ 25.1% ✓
• Asset-mgmt share = 1,276.2/3,056.8 = 41.75% ≈ 41.7% ✓
• IB share = 705.2/3,056.8 = 23.07% ≈ 23.1% ✓
• Brokerage share = 489.6/3,056.8 = 16.02% ≈ 16.0% ✓

Two facts: fundamentals belong to the series’ most balanced grouping, but implied cost of equity is the highest. “Strong fundamentals + large discount” coexist here.

2. Why It Doesn’t Map Onto Any of the Four Existing Peaks

2.1 Distance from the Meritz (Capital Cancellation) Coordinate

Part 1’s identity: ROE ~22%, payout ratio 60%+, share-buyback-and-cancel algorithm.

Cancellation algorithm and payout structure both mismatch. Meritz mapping fails.

2.2 Distance from the Kiwoom (Capital Turnover) Coordinate

Part 2’s identity: ROE ~20%, trading-volume beta, retail #1, asset-management turnover.

Korea Investment & Securities’s FY2025 net operating revenue mix: brokerage 16.0%, asset-mgmt 41.7%, IB 23.1%. A different category from Kiwoom’s “retail trading-volume beta.” Kiwoom mapping touches partially.

2.3 Distance from the KB (Foreign Access) Coordinate

Part 3’s identity: foreign ownership 75.72%, MSCI Korea weight 2.0%, CET1 13.6%, payout ratio 83% (incl. cancellation).

Almost everything mismatches. KB is the “first gate foreigners pass through to buy Korean financials”; Korea Investment is an “owner-operator-centered investment-bank holding.” Same broader category, but fundamentally different governance philosophies.

2.4 Distance from the Shinhan (Transit) Coordinate

Part 4 framed Shinhan as the “first follower transiting toward KB.”

Both are “in progress, not at peak,” but in different directions. Shinhan moves toward “an existing coordinate”; Korea Investment is in a position requiring recognition of a new coordinate to be re-rated.

2.5 Mapping Matrix Summary

Four don’t map cleanly. For the first time in the series, we encountered a company none of the existing coordinates can be applied to. This fact defines Korea Investment Holdings’s place in the series.

3. Korea Investment Holdings’s Own Coordinate — The Capital-Operations Flywheel

3.1 Self-Definition

Korea Investment Holdings describes itself officially as “Korea’s only investment-bank-centric financial holding company.” This self-definition matters in series terms because the company itself is declaring it doesn’t belong in the existing categories.

Business lines:

• Korea Investment & Securities (brokerage, IB, asset-mgmt, trading, short-term notes, IMA)
• Korea Investment Trust Mgmt, Korea Investment Value Asset Mgmt, Real Asset Mgmt (asset management)
• Korea Investment Savings Bank, Korea Investment Capital (lending)
• Korea Investment Partners, Korea Investment PE (VC/PE)
• Korea Investment Real Estate Trust

This lineup differs from Meritz (insurance + securities), Kiwoom (securities only), and KB (bank-centric universal).

3.2 The Capital-Operations Flywheel — 5-Step Mechanism

Korea Investment Holdings’s core mechanism operates as a 5-step flywheel. This structure exists nowhere else in the series.

[Step 1: Customer inflow — the entry point]
Brokerage (₩489.6B) + WM (₩239.3B fee revenue) + financial-product distribution
attracts customers and customer assets.
Brokerage is "traffic," not "profit center."
       ↓
[Step 2: Funding — the core choke point]
RP + short-term notes (발행어음, ₩21.48T, +24.0%) + IMA (₩1.89T) + customer deposits
provide market funding — economically functional like bank deposits.
       ↓
[Step 3: Asset creation — the asset factory]
IB (₩705.2B, +14.9%) + PF + acquisition financing + bond underwriting + operating-asset addition
IB is both "fee business" and "asset-sourcing factory."
       ↓
[Step 4: Operations — ROE leverage]
Asset-management/operations (₩1.27T, +76.3%) + trading + asset-mgmt subsidiaries (AUM ₩502.5T) + VC/PE
Dividend & distribution income ₩552.3B (+49.6%)
       ↓
[Step 5: Recovery & reinvestment — equity growth]
Exits + fees + interest + investment income → capital accumulation
Equity ₩9.7T → ₩12.1T → 2030 target ₩15T+
→ Higher funding capacity feeds back to Step 1.

3.3 Fundamental Difference vs. Other Series Companies

What makes this flywheel different from the other companies:

All four mechanisms are “different paths to the same ROE,” but Korea Investment’s path is unique in the series.

3.4 The Core Choke Point — Math of the Capital Cap

The most direct evidence for “capital-operations platform” is the cap math behind short-term notes and IMA.

Equity ₩12.10T
  → Short-term notes cap = equity × 200% = ₩24.20T
    (Current outstanding ₩21.48T, utilization \~88.8%)
  → Combined notes + IMA cap = equity × 300% = ₩36.30T
    (Current notes + IMA = ₩23.37T, utilization \~64.4%)

Verifications:

• Notes cap = 12.10 × 2 = ₩24.20T ✓
• Notes utilization = 21.48 / 24.20 = 88.76% ≈ 88.8% ✓
• Combined IMA cap = 12.10 × 3 = ₩36.30T ✓
• Combined IMA utilization = (21.48 + 1.89) / 36.30 = 23.37 / 36.30 = 64.38% ≈ 64.4% ✓

Single-line read: every ₩1T of additional equity at Korea Investment Holdings expands its funding capacity by ₩3T. Reaching the 2030 target of ₩15T equity expands combined capacity from ₩36.3T to ₩45T. That is the accounting essence of the “capital-operations platform” model.

This mechanism is absent from every other company in the series. Neither Meritz, Kiwoom, nor KB has “200–300% leverage of equity through funding” as a core variable. This single fact defines Korea Investment Holdings as a separate category.

3.5 P × Q × C of the New Coordinate

Korea Investment Holdings’s P × Q × C uses different variables than the rest of the series.

Critically, equity itself enters Q. In the other companies, equity acts only as a denominator (in ROE). Here, equity simultaneously acts as the cap that determines the numerator — increasing equity grows the ROE denominator, but it grows the funding capacity that creates the numerator at the same time.

This is the inverse of Meritz’s “capital-buyback compounder.” Meritz shrinks capital to make the denominator smaller; Korea Investment grows capital to expand both numerator and denominator simultaneously. Both are valid paths to maintaining ROE.

4. Decomposing Implied Cost of Equity 17.3%

4.1 Position Inside the Series Matrix

Meritz:           22.4% / 1.94× = 11.5%
Kiwoom:           20.7% / 1.39× = 14.9%
KB:               10.5% / 0.88× = 11.9%
Shinhan:          11.9% / 0.78× = 15.3%
Korea Investment: 18.5% / 1.07× = 17.3%

Highest implied cost of equity in the series. +5.8 pp vs Meritz, +5.4 pp vs KB, +2.4 pp vs Kiwoom, +2.0 pp vs Shinhan.

The gap matters because Korea Investment’s ROE 18.5% is the second-highest after Meritz, yet the market applies the highest cost of equity. The ROE order and the cost-of-equity order don’t align.

4.2 Five Discount Factors That Build the 5.8 pp Gap

The 5.8 pp gap is not “mispricing.” There are accounting reasons for the 17.3% the market applies.

Each factor adding 0.8–1.5 pp to cost of equity sums cleanly to 5.8 pp. The 17.3% the market applies is not coincidence — it is the accounting consequence of a company that doesn’t fit into a category the market can classify cleanly.

This decomposition matters in series terms because whichever discount factor closes first determines the speed at which the 17.3% narrows. Operations normalization is verified at the 1Q26 earnings release; insurance-M&A at the price-decision moment; savings-bank provisioning at quarterly trends; governance at chair separation; shareholder return at a cancellation announcement — each closes at a different time.

4.3 ‘Recognition Speed’ Determines Cost-of-Equity Compression

This is where the series’ core message activates. The 17.3% is the accounting signal that “coordinate definition is in progress.” When the market clearly accepts “investment-bank-style financial holding” as a category, cost of equity narrows naturally to 14–15%.

Visualizing as PBR scenarios:

Verifications:

• 16.0% price: 224,562 × (18.5/16.0) = 224,562 × 1.156 = ₩259,594 ≈ ₩260,490
• 15.0% price: 224,562 × (18.5/15.0) = 224,562 × 1.233 = ₩276,985 ≈ ₩276,210
• 12.0% price: 224,562 × (18.5/12.0) = 224,562 × 1.542 = ₩346,275 ≈ ₩345,820

Single-line read: if cost of equity narrows from 17.3% to 12–13% with full coordinate-definition recognition, the same BPS / ROE re-prices to roughly ₩320,000–₩346,000. Sell-side targets — ₩335,000 (Daishin) and ₩399,000 (SK Securities) — sit inside this range for the same arithmetic reason.

This is the math. For the cost of equity to actually narrow, the five discount factors need to close one by one — which is what the next section’s two self-stabilization mechanisms drive.

5. Two Mechanisms That Determine the Recognition Speed

The recognition speed of the new coordinate is determined by two self-stabilizing mechanisms — same kind of mechanisms seen in Meritz Part 1 (Section 4.2), Kiwoom Part 2 (Section 7), and KB Part 3 (Section 6).

5.1 Mechanism 1 — Governance Self-Stabilization

Korea Investment Holdings’s governance balances “owner-operator” with “board independence.”

Current structure:

• Kim Nam-koo holds CEO and Board Chair concurrently (12 consecutive years through 2026)
• Outside directors comprise 75.0% (6 of 8)
• Kim Nam-koo + related parties 21.3%, NPS 13.4%, foreign 36.7%, treasury 5.4%
• Not absolute-majority controlled

Warning signal: 2026 AGM saw Kim Nam-koo’s inside-director election approved at 88.6% and Oh Tae-kyun’s at 88.9%. But the director-compensation-cap approval was 59.8%, with 40.2% opposed/abstain. Not management-replacement territory, but a clear accounting signal of shareholder discomfort with compensation/governance.

Two faces:

Self-stabilization direction:

ROE 15%+ held + capital-operations flywheel running
       ↓
Trigger for board-independence strengthening (chair separation, lead independent director)
       ↓
Owner-operator credibility verified
       ↓
Governance discount 1.5 pp gradual reduction
       ↓
Cost of equity narrows from 17.3% → \~16%

When this mechanism operates, the credibility “this platform is well-managed” accrues at the accounting level. Same kind of trust accumulation as Meritz Part 1’s “buyback algorithm operating algorithmically every quarter.”

5.2 Mechanism 2 — Shareholder-Return Self-Stabilization

Shareholder return clearly improved in 2025 — but compared with the rest of the series, Korea Investment is still at “stage 1.”

Payout ratio 5-year trend:
2021 20.4% → 2022 21.1% → 2023 21.9% → 2024 22.4% → 2025 25.1%
DPS 2024 ₩3,980 → 2025 ₩8,690 (+118.3%)
Total dividend 2024 ₩232.8B → 2025 ₩507.8B (+118.2%)

Verifications:

• 5-year payout uplift: 25.1 − 20.4 = +4.7 pp
• DPS change: 8,690/3,980 − 1 = +118.34% ≈ +118.3% ✓

Constructive — but compared with the rest of the series:

Is the company’s “growth-first” logic rational?

Internal-retention rate 74.9% × ROE 18.5% = sustainable growth rate ~13.9%. That math justifies the “growth-first” logic — equity grows ~14% per year even without distribution.

Payout ratio 25.1% maintained + ROE 18.5%
       ↓
Sustainable growth rate \~13.9%
       ↓
Equity ₩12T → ₩15T → higher funding capacity
       ↓
Platform model accounting verification
       ↓
"Growth-first" policy validity confirmed
       ↓
Cost of equity narrowing

But for this mechanism to operate as self-stabilization, the credibility that “growth-first is justified” is needed. Core signals of that credibility:

• Cancellation of part of the 5.4% treasury shares — explicit signal that “per-share value is also being managed”
• Explicit total-shareholder-return ratio of 30%+ — algorithmizing capital-return policy
• Explicit ROE / capital-ratio criteria for M&A — capital-deployment discipline verification
• 30%+ payout-ratio policy or 35%+ TSR policy announcement — moving from stage 1 to stage 2

If even one of these arrives, cost of equity narrows by one step. A buyback announcement alone could compress about 1.0 pp of discount.

5.3 The Two Mechanisms’ Joint Operation

The two mechanisms aren’t independent. They operate together.

Governance self-stabilization (chair separation, outside-director power)
       ↕
Shareholder-return self-stabilization (cancellation, TSR explicit)
       ↓
Capital-operations platform credibility accrues
       ↓
"Investment-bank financial holding" coordinate gets recognized
       ↓
Cost of equity 17.3% → 14–15% → 12–13%

This is why Korea Investment Holdings reads in the series as “a company defining its own coordinate.” Meritz already runs the buyback algorithm; KB already has the foreign-access infrastructure. Korea Investment is operating these two mechanisms but hasn’t completed them. That’s why the 17.3% applies. And the speed at which the 17.3% narrows is the speed at which the new coordinate gets recognized.

6. Quality-Verification of the +76.3% Operations Growth

Section 4 attributed 1.5 pp of cost-of-equity discount to “operations P&L volatility.” This factor matters in series terms because it determines how repeatable Korea Investment’s ROE 18.5% really is.

6.1 Decomposing the ₩1.27T Operations Line

FY2025 Korea Investment & Securities operations was ₩1,276.2B, +76.3% YoY. Inside it:

Dividend & distribution at ₩552.3B is ~43% of operations revenue. This component is partly recurring — so long as the underlying assets are held, dividends and distributions arrive each year.

6.2 Comparing Margin Stability vs Other Series Companies

In the same dimension, comparing margin volatility across the series:

Korea Investment’s quarterly volatility is on a similar level to Kiwoom, but the source differs. Kiwoom is exposed directly to trading-volume swings; Korea Investment to operations and valuation-gain volatility. Both create grounds for the market to apply a “stability discount.”

6.3 ‘Notes/IMA-Backed Structurality’ Absorbing Volatility

There’s an important consistency here. As Korea Investment Holdings’s notes/IMA-based funding expands, the operating-asset base itself grows structurally. Even at the same operations yield, the asset base growing from ₩21.5T to ₩25T to ₩30T mechanically lifts absolute operating income.

Operations P&L = Operating assets × Operations yield

If operating assets grow structurally:
  Same yield → step-up absolute income each year
  → Volatility appears smaller in absolute terms
  → Market reclassifies as "structural earnings stream"
  → 1.5 pp cost-of-equity discount narrows

For this scenario to operate, two things must occur simultaneously — notes/IMA balance growth + operations margin held. Both are quarterly-trackable. Tracking them is exactly what this series does.

7. The ‘New Coordinate’ Adds a Meta-Message to the Series

Part 5 introduces a new analytical dimension. The series so far has tracked “where each company sits within an existing coordinate.”

Parts 1–3: Peak landscape (Meritz, Kiwoom, KB)
Part 4:    Transit between peaks (Shinhan → KB coordinate)
Part 5:    New coordinate definition (Korea Investment → capital-operations platform)

The chapter shift’s meaning is simple: the recognition shift in Korean financials has deepened from “which of the three peaks does it join?” to “can it define a new coordinate?”

Where Shinhan was “a follower transiting toward an existing peak,” Korea Investment is “a company for which an existing peak isn’t the right answer.” Therefore, applying Meritz’s or KB’s multiple to it directly doesn’t work — a fresh multiple matrix matched to its own business model (notes / IMA / IB / operations) is required.

This “new-coordinate definition” analytical dimension is the natural next stage as the series deepens. Mirae Asset Securities, DB Insurance, and other names may produce additional cases that don’t map to existing peaks. Part 5 introduces the first instance of that dimension.

8. Two Honest Caveats

8.1 Operations Earnings Need Structural Verification

FY2025 Korea Investment & Securities operations growth of +76.3% is unmistakably strong. But inside it sit market-bull effect, PI valuation gains, and one-off dividend/distribution recognition. Treating the entire ₩1.27T as repeatable income could overstate ROE 18.5%.

That said, structural notes/IMA expansion grows the operating-asset base itself. Some is one-off; some is structural. What the series tracks is how the share of repeatable income changes quarter-by-quarter — that is the accounting verification of coordinate definition.

This isn’t a weakness — it’s the model’s self-verification mechanism. Same kind of consistency as Kiwoom Part 2 Section 7.1’s “accept quarterly volatility, buy annual mean ROE.”

8.2 Does Equity Expansion Mean ROE Maintenance?

The capital-operations platform model assumes “equity +₩1T → funding capacity +₩3T → IB / operating-asset expansion → ROE held.” But this assumption has a precondition — expanded assets must hold yield.

If competition in notes/IMA markets intensifies, spreads compress. Same capital with thinner margins means ROE dilutes alongside equity expansion. This scenario crystallizes if the company executes an expensive insurance M&A, or if competition for premium IB deals heats up.

This is the self-stabilization mechanism inherent to the model identity rather than a defect. The capital-operations platform model itself operates on “the balance between funding capacity and asset margin.” If that balance breaks, the 17.3% cost of equity stays where it is — that is the scenario in which the new coordinate fails to gain recognition.

9. The Next Verification Step — Signals That Track Coordinate-Definition Speed

Not trade triggers. Observation points that show how fast “new-coordinate definition” is gaining recognition.

9.1 Korea Investment Holdings — Verifying the Coordinate Definition

• 1Q26 controlling-shareholder net income: sell-side estimates between ₩604.4B (Yuanta) and ₩822.0B (Daishin). Above ₩700B implies annualized ROE ~17%-class — first accounting verification of the coordinate.
• Further IMA balance expansion: ₩1.89T → ₩3T+ progression. Core variable for the capital-operations platform model.
• Notes utilization 88.8% → 95%: the signal of how equity-expansion pressure operates.
• Operations P&L quality: separation of valuation-gain share vs. interest/dividend share. Verification of FY2025 +76.3%’s structurality.
• Savings-bank delinquency 8.59% stabilization: signal of provisioning-discount 1.0 pp reduction.

9.2 Self-Stabilization Mechanisms — Key Triggers

Estimated cost-of-equity impact for each:

Single-line read: all six triggers operating together can compress cost-of-equity discount by roughly 6.0 pp combined. 17.3% − 6.0% ≈ 11.3% — Meritz/KB-class cost of equity. All operating simultaneously is unlikely; even half operating narrows it to the 14% range.

9.3 Series-Level Meta Signals

• Time-trajectory of the 17.3% implied cost of equity: speed at which it narrows toward 14–15% directly = speed of coordinate-definition recognition.
• Sell-side category migration: from “securities-cycle name” to “investment-bank financial holding.”
• Gradual rise in foreign ownership: 36.7% → 45–50% would mean global capital begins recognizing the new coordinate.
• Other companies’ “new-coordinate definition” cases: Mirae Asset Securities (PI / digital-asset platform), DB Insurance (insurance capital operations), and others may enter this analytical dimension.

10. The Single Closing Line

This series painted “three peaks settled” in Parts 1–3, opened the “transit between peaks” chapter in Part 4. Part 5’s Korea Investment Holdings adds another chapter — “a company that doesn’t map onto any of the four existing peaks, and is defining its own coordinate.”

ROE 18.5%, PBR 1.07×, cost of equity 17.3%. These numbers describe a position different from the rest of the series. Neither Meritz nor Kiwoom nor KB nor Shinhan accurately explains Korea Investment Holdings’s coordinate. A separate category called “investment-bank financial holding” — making ROE not by shrinking equity but by using equity as funding capacity, through the 5-step capital-operations flywheel: equity ₩12.1T → notes ₩21.5T → IMA ₩1.9T → combined cap ₩36.3T.

The five discount factors that build the 17.3% — operations P&L volatility (1.5 pp) + insurance-M&A possibility (0.8 pp) + savings-bank/capital provisioning (1.0 pp) + governance discount (1.5 pp) + weak shareholder-return policy (1.0 pp) — are all accounting-trackable. The speed at which each factor closes one by one is the speed at which the coordinate definition is recognized.

The recognition speed of the new coordinate by the market is determined by two self-stabilization mechanisms. Governance (chair separation, treasury-share cancellation) and shareholder return (TSR explicit). When both mechanisms operate, the implied cost of equity 17.3% narrows naturally to 14–15%, and at the same BPS / same ROE the price re-prints one notch higher. That is the landscape of accounting-level coordinate-definition closure.

The recognition shift in Korean financials has deepened one more level — from “which existing peak does it join?” to “can it define a new coordinate?” The first case of that question arrived in Part 5.

The next post in the series returns when (1) Korea Investment Holdings’s 1Q26 results print, (2) IMA balance expands further, (3) a treasury cancellation or shareholder-return policy is explicitly announced, and (4) other companies’ “new-coordinate definition” cases — Mirae Asset Securities, DB Insurance, and others — emerge.

FAQ — Korea Investment Holdings

Q: Is Korea Investment Holdings publicly traded? A: Yes. Korea Investment Holdings is listed on KOSPI under ticker 071050. Korea Investment & Securities, the group’s flagship securities subsidiary, is unlisted and 100%-owned by the holding company.

Q: Who owns Korea Investment Holdings? A: Kim Nam-koo (Chairman) and related parties hold ~21.3% of shares; National Pension Service ~13.4%; foreign investors ~36.7%; treasury shares 5.4%. The remainder is held by domestic institutional and retail investors.

Q: What is Korea Investment & Securities? A: The flagship securities subsidiary inside Korea Investment Holdings. It runs brokerage, investment-banking, asset-management, trading, short-term-notes (발행어음), and IMA (individual-account) operations. It is not separately listed.

Q: What is 발행어음 (short-term-notes)? A: A Korean broker-dealer-issued short-term-note product where customers receive yield comparable to bank deposits. Key Korean securities houses (including Korea Investment & Securities) issue notes up to 200% of equity, providing market funding that enables IB and operating-asset expansion. Korea Investment & Securities’s outstanding notes balance reached ₩21.48T at end-2025 (+24.0% YoY), the largest in the industry.

Q: What is IMA? A: Investment-Management Account — a comprehensive funding vehicle for super-sized broker-dealers that combines features beyond standard short-term notes. Korea Investment & Securities’s IMA balance reached ₩1.89T as of January 2026.

Q: What is the difference between Korea Investment Holdings and Korea Investment & Securities? A: Korea Investment Holdings (KOSPI 071050) is the listed parent holding company. Korea Investment & Securities is the wholly-owned, unlisted flagship securities subsidiary. International investors gaining exposure to “Korea Investment & Securities” do so through Korea Investment Holdings’s KOSPI listing.

Q: What is the difference between Korea Investment Holdings and Mirae Asset Securities? A: Both are major Korean securities-centered holdings, but with different model identities. Korea Investment is more centered on traditional IB / asset-management / investment-bank-style funding (notes, IMA). Mirae Asset Securities has greater emphasis on PI investments, digital-asset platforms, and global asset-management. Also, Korea Investment Holdings is a holding company; Mirae Asset Securities is the operating securities entity.

Q: How does Korea Investment Holdings differ from Kiwoom Securities? A: Kiwoom is Korea’s #1 retail-brokerage with ~16% market share and ROE driven by trading-volume cycles. Korea Investment is more diversified — brokerage 16%, asset-mgmt 41.7%, IB 23.1%. Korea Investment’s ROE-creation mechanism is “expand equity → expand funding capacity → expand assets,” not “trading-volume turnover.”

Q: What is the dividend policy? A: 2025 payout ratio reached 25.1% (+2.7 pp YoY). DPS rose to ₩8,690 (+118.3% YoY). The company has begun framing capital return more explicitly under Korea’s Value-up regime, though the explicit total-shareholder-return target is still being awaited.

This post is research and commentary only, not investment advice. ROE / PBR / cost-of-equity / payout-ratio scenarios are based on sell-side estimates (Daishin, SK Securities, Yuanta, Kiwoom, Meritz, WiseReport, etc.), company IR materials, and corporate-value-up disclosures; actual outcomes may differ. The five-discount-factor quantification is the analyst’s inference; the market’s actual cost-of-equity decomposition may differ. Tickers cited are illustrative for the framework, not recommendations. Do your own due diligence and consult licensed advisors before any investment decision.

Disclaimer: For research and information purposes only. Not investment advice. Names cited are for analytical illustration; readers should perform their own due diligence and consult licensed advisors before any investment decision.