The US 400GW Nuclear Plan and the Westinghouse Stake Negotiations: The Opportunity for Korea, and the Expectations Already Priced In

Wed, 16 Sep 2026 16:00:00 +0900

At the moment the United States declared it would build nuclear power plants again on a large scale, Korea is negotiating what it will receive in return for providing the capital and manufacturing capacity to build those plants. Winning a few construction contracts is a different transaction from participating in the long-term profits of the nuclear industry. That difference is precisely why the Westinghouse stake negotiations matter.

Korea–US cooperation can expand the market for Korea’s nuclear industry. However, the economic value depends less on the ownership percentage and more on procurement rights, the scope of joint exports, and the allocation of construction losses. Among Korean-listed companies, we see Doosan Enerbility as the industrial center of gravity for this benefit — but that does not mean it is the stock most likely to deliver the greatest return at its current share price.

America’s 400GW is not a confirmed order backlog. Westinghouse does not hold a monopoly on nuclear technology outside China. Acquiring a stake does not automatically increase Korean companies’ contracts. Distinguishing these three points is what allows a fair assessment of the negotiations’ significant opportunity — without exaggeration.¹²³

Information Basis and Verification Status
Reporting on the negotiations is based on information confirmed through 11:35 a.m. on September 16, 2026. Share price comparisons are standardized to the closing price on September 15.

Official Confirmation: The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy stated on September 15 that specific nuclear investment details, including the acquisition of a Westinghouse stake, had not yet been decided.
Media Reports: Reports mention Korea's demand for a stake of 15% or more with board representation, and the US offering 5–10%. On September 16, reports also emerged of a cancelled National Assembly briefing and a possible delay in MOU signing.
Still Unconfirmed: The acquisition price, the investing entity, the seller, the composition of new versus existing shares, board rights, per-plant order amounts, and loss guarantees. The scenarios below do not describe a signed agreement.

The status distinctions above are drawn by cross-referencing Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy briefing materials with reports from Yonhap News and Korea Economic Daily. Even among articles published the same day, signing timelines differed, so no specific announcement date has been treated as a confirmed event.³⁴⁵

1. How Large a Plan Is 400GW

In a May 2025 executive order, the United States set a target to expand nuclear capacity from approximately 100GW in 2024 to 400GW by 2050. This does not mean building 400GW from scratch; it means increasing the total operating capacity to 400GW in the end.¹

GW is a measure of a plant’s instantaneous output capacity. 1GW equals 1 million kW. How much electricity is actually generated in a year is expressed in GWh or TWh — output multiplied by operating hours. Plant size and electricity consumption should not be compared as if they were the same unit.

Figure 1. From approximately 100GW to 400GW: a net addition of 300GW

2024 baseline

~100GW

2050 target

400GW

+300GWnet addition over current capacity

12GW/yrsimple average over 25 years

10 startstarget for large reactor groundbreakings by 2030

Source: White House Executive Order, May 23, 2025. 300÷25=12GW is a calculation to convey scale, not an official annual procurement schedule. If existing plants are retired, additional construction will be required to replace them.

Converting the net addition of 300GW into AP1000-sized units of 1.1GW yields approximately 273 reactors. The actual plan may blend uprates of existing plants, life extensions, large reactors, and small modular reactors, so 273 units does not mean 273 AP1000 orders.

The near-term 2030 target is 5GW of uprates at existing plants and the groundbreaking of 10 new large reactors. Reading this as a target to complete all 10 reactors by 2030 significantly overstates how soon supply will materialize.⁶

The policy’s starting point is also not confined to a single administration. In 2024, the US Department of Energy set a target to add approximately 200GW of nuclear capacity by 2050, roughly tripling the then-existing capacity. In 2025, the final aggregate target was raised to 400GW. The long-term direction shows continuity, but the higher target also means the burden on actual construction pace and financing has grown.⁷¹

There Is Also Evidence That the Declaration Is Turning Into Action

On June 23, 2026, the US Department of Energy announced $17.5 billion in conditional loan commitments for procuring long-lead components. Long-lead components are equipment such as reactor pressure vessels that take a long time from order to delivery. The structure supports up to five projects, each procuring components for two AP1000 units.⁸

Each project must first commit equity of $500 million each from Westinghouse and its utility partner — $1 billion in total — before the loan can be drawn. If all five projects proceed on these terms, Westinghouse’s aggregate equity commitment would reach $2.5 billion. This is a maximum-case calculation derived by multiplying the conditions; it is not an amount already spent.⁸

This program is evidence that nuclear expansion is not merely rhetoric. At the same time, the loan is disbursed only once technical, legal, environmental, and financial conditions are met, and this loan does not finance the entire construction cost of a power plant. Progress in supply-chain financing and final investment decisions for power plants cannot be treated as the same milestone.

2. How Far Has Korea Risen Historically — From Importer to Where?

Competitiveness in the nuclear industry does not end with a single set of blueprints. It accumulates through repeatedly constructing the same design, matching component quality, and incorporating lessons from operations back into the design.

The United States led the early spread of commercial nuclear power. Korea started as an importer of foreign technology and equipment, as exemplified by Kori Unit 1, which began commercial operation in 1978. Since then, Korea has built up capabilities in design, components, construction, and operations, and with the UAE Barakah project, four Korean-model reactors entered commercial operation in sequence between 2021 and 2024.⁹¹⁰¹¹

Figure 2. From a relationship of buying technology to one of sharing profits

1957 · United StatesShippingport — the historical starting point of commercial nuclear power

1978 · KoreaKori Unit 1 commercial operation; foreign technology adoption

2017 · WestinghouseFiles for bankruptcy protection under the weight of new US nuclear construction costs

2024 · BarakahCommercial operating track record secured for four Korean-model reactors

2025 · Korea–US companiesGlobal settlement of intellectual property disputes

2026 · NegotiationsDiscussions on exchanging capital participation for business participation rights

Sources: US Department of Energy, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, Westinghouse corporate history and official announcements, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy briefing materials. The final entry is at the negotiation stage and does not represent a closed equity transaction.

There is an important paradox here. Even Westinghouse, with its formidable reactor technology, filed for bankruptcy protection in 2017 under the financial burden of new nuclear construction projects in the United States. This is a case study showing that technological competitiveness and the profitability of construction contracts are separate things.¹²

Conversely, Korea’s overseas completion track record is evidence of project execution capability, but the contract structure and labor sourcing conditions of the UAE cannot be transplanted directly to the United States. US site labor, licensing, construction standards, and litigation risk must be managed separately. The fact that Korea can build well does not by itself lead to the conclusion that it will complete US nuclear plants cheaply and quickly.

The current negotiations are therefore not a simple reversal of the past technology-import relationship. It is more accurate to view them as a process of determining the price and responsibilities under which the design, market access, and policy support that the US holds will be bundled with the manufacturing experience, construction capabilities, and capital that Korea holds.

3. Why the AI Power Gap Makes Nuclear Important Again

In the IEA’s 2026 outlook, global data center electricity consumption rises from 485TWh in 2025 to 950TWh in 2030 — roughly doubling. This figure covers total data center consumption including general cloud services, not AI consumption alone.¹³

Figure 3. Data Center Power Consumption: Roughly Doubling in Five Years

2025

485TWh

2030 forecast

950TWh

Growth rate = (950÷485−1)×100 = approximately 95.9%

Source: IEA, Key Questions on Energy and AI, 2026. Based on all data centers worldwide. This should not be interpreted as US-only demand or AI-only demand.

The shortage is not only a question of total global electricity. The real issue is whether sufficient, reliably stable power can be delivered in the specific regions where data centers are located, at the times they need it. Even if a power plant exists elsewhere, it cannot be used if the transmission grid is not connected. If servers are ready but waiting for grid interconnection, the invested equipment cannot generate revenue. The IEA also highlights the time lag between rapidly expanding data centers and slowly scaling power infrastructure.¹³

Nuclear power’s advantage is its ability to deliver large-scale, low-carbon electricity over long periods. Once a plant is commissioned, it can underpin long-term power purchase agreements. However, outages for maintenance and fuel replacement do occur, and AI loads fluctuate instantaneously as well, so a single nuclear unit alone does not resolve all hours of power quality and reserve requirements.¹⁴

Moreover, when a data center signs a new contract to buy electricity from an already-operating nuclear plant, the nation’s total generation does not increase by that amount. The effect of changing who buys existing power must be distinguished from the effect of actually increasing supply through plant restarts, uprates, or new construction.

Does Nuclear Immediately Replace Gas?

Figure 4. Alternatives to the Power Gap Differ in Timing and Role

Alternative	What it can do in the near term	What it does not solve
Transmission lines, substations, demand management	Connects existing generation slack and reduces demand during congested hours.	Cannot infinitely increase generation itself; grid interconnection work is also required.
Life extensions, uprates, and restarts of existing nuclear plants	Prevents decline in low-carbon supply or secures additional output.	A life extension is different from new supply. Subject to equipment and safety review conditions.
Gas-fired generation	Adds dispatchable power.	Requires turbine lead times, fuel prices, pipelines, emissions regulations, and reserve equipment.
Solar, wind, and batteries	Increases generation and smooths inter-period variation where conditions are suitable.	Batteries do not generate electricity. Covering extended periods of low generation changes the cost equation significantly.
New large nuclear plants	Can become a pillar of large-scale low-carbon supply from the 2030s onward.	Projects starting now will not resolve all near-term power shortfalls within a few years.
Small modular reactors, geothermal, and others	Provide new options suited to specific scale, site, and industrial demand.	Commercialization status, fuel, and local conditions differ by design. A smaller reactor does not always mean cheaper electricity.

A role comparison based on IEA power supply analysis. Timelines are not confirmed completion schedules for individual plants. Wide tables can be scrolled horizontally.

Actual development concepts also combine multiple generation sources. The Blue Energy project in Texas announced by GE Vernova in August 2026 envisions securing approximately 1GW of gas-fired generation first by 2030, then adding up to five BWRX-300 small modular reactors from 2032. Since the target for a final investment decision is 2027, this cannot yet be counted as operating capacity or confirmed total construction revenue.¹⁵ This case shows two things. Nuclear and gas can complement each other within the timeline of a project. And the benefits of US nuclear expansion do not flow to Westinghouse alone.

The growth of AI power demand does not follow a straight line either. The energy required for the same task may fall, while model usage and more complex tasks may rise. Power generation investment must verify actual electricity demand — the sum of both factors — and customers’ ability to pay.¹³

4. Nuclear economics depend on financing as much as technology

Nuclear is a business that spends heavily on construction upfront and recovers its investment by selling electricity over many years. Even with identical facilities, higher financing rates and longer construction schedules increase the capital cost that each unit of electricity must carry.

The calculation below is not an actual plant quote — it is an illustration of the principle. Construction cost excluding interest during construction is fixed at $6,000 per kW, operating life at 60 years, and capacity factor at 90%. Fuel costs, operating costs, and decommissioning costs are not included.

Figure 5. The same nuclear plant carries different burdens depending on the cost of capital

Cost of capital 4%

$33.6

Cost of capital 8%

$61.5

Cost of capital 10%

$76.4

Unit: capital recovery cost per MWh generated, USD. Author's assumptions and calculations. This is not an actual levelized cost of energy (LCOE). Bars start from zero; operating costs and interest during construction are excluded.

Formula and unit verification

Annual capital recovery factor = r×(1+r)⁶⁰÷[(1+r)⁶⁰−1], where r is the assumed annual cost of capital.

Annual generation per 1 kW = 8,760 hours × 90% ÷ 1,000 = 7.884 MWh.

Therefore, capital recovery cost per unit of generation = $6,000 × annual capital recovery factor ÷ 7.884 MWh. Results are rounded to one decimal place. The purpose of this calculation is to compare interest-rate sensitivity, not to validate the business case of any specific plant.

Government financial support, long-term power purchase agreements from creditworthy buyers, and schedule reductions from repeat construction can all change the economics of nuclear. However, transferring risk to the government does not make the risk disappear. Rather than lowering the developer’s cost of capital, the burden of losses may shift to taxpayers or electricity consumers.

For Korea’s investment in the United States to carry real economic meaning, it must go beyond simply providing cheap money. Korea must secure returns and business rights commensurate with the credit, currency, and construction risks it bears.

5. What is missed by dividing the global nuclear market into China and everything else

Looking at the recent history of new nuclear construction, China and Russia have accumulated far more repeat-build experience than the United States. According to the IEA, of the 52 reactors on which construction began worldwide between 2017 and 2024, 25 used Chinese designs and 23 used Russian designs.²

Figure 6. Design origin of 52 reactors on which construction began, 2017–2024

25234

Chinese design 48.1%Russian design 44.2%Other 7.7%

Source: IEA, The Path to a New Era for Nuclear Energy, 2025. Combined 48÷52=92.3% are Chinese or Russian designs. Based on construction starts during the specified period; this is not current operating plant market share or 2026 order share.

The market excluding China includes Russia. Therefore, non-Chinese nuclear demand cannot all be added up as potential orders for Korean and US firms. Buyers seeking to avoid Chinese and Russian technology, and buyers who may choose Russian nuclear plants based on financing terms, are different markets.

Russia’s competitiveness lies not only in reactor design but in bundling construction, fuel, and financing together. Conversely, countries seeking to reduce dependence on Russia want an alternative package that includes fuel and maintenance as well. For Korea and the United States to compete, they must present not only reactor price but the reliability and financing terms of this entire bundle.¹⁶¹⁷

Who designs, who builds, and who sells the electricity

The designer develops the reactor’s architecture and safety logic. Equipment manufacturers produce components to that design. Constructors install and integrate the work on site. The plant owner finances and sells the electricity, while the operator runs the facility safely. A single company may fill multiple roles, but the roles themselves must be distinguished.

Figure 7. Role map of major nuclear camps

Camp	Design & technology	Manufacturing & construction	Ownership & operation, fuel & services
China	CNNC·CGN's Hualong series, SPIC·SNERDI's CAP1000·CAP1400 series	Domestic design and construction organizations and equipment supply chains linked to large domestic orders	CNNC·CGN·SPIC-affiliated power developers develop and operate projects
Russia	Rosatom's VVER series	In-group overseas project and construction organizations such as ASE	TVEL fuel and long-term services combined with state-backed financing
US · AP1000	Westinghouse reactor design, technology, and fuel	Project-specific construction consortia and international supply chains. Korea can participate in manufacturing and construction	In the case of Vogtle, owners such as Georgia Power and Southern Nuclear as operator. Westinghouse does not own and operate all plants
US·Japan · BWR series	GE Vernova Hitachi's BWRX-300	Pursued through country- and site-specific partners	Power developers lead development at sites such as Darlington in Canada. A separate option from AP1000
France	EDF·Framatome's EPR·EPR2 system	French and European suppliers and contractors	EDF's power generation business and nuclear plant operation. State-level repeat construction and financial support
Korea	KEPCO·KHNP's export project framework, KEPCO E&C's design	Doosan Enerbility's major components, Hyundai Engineering & Construction and others for civil work	KHNP's operating experience and fuel and maintenance firms. Ownership and operation structure of overseas plants varies by project

This map shows representative roles and does not cover all companies or reactor types. Sources: CNNC Hualong·Bailong materials, Rosatom·TVEL, Westinghouse Vogtle announcements, GE Vernova, EDF, KHNP, Doosan Enerbility, Hyundai E&C official materials. See source list below.

China’s CAP1000 has a lineage connected to the US AP1000 technology. The nationality of a technology and the nationality of the supply chain that actually executes the project do not always coincide. In the Bailong project introduced by CNNC, a SPIC-affiliated owner is confirmed to have placed contracts with the same group’s SNERDI.¹⁸¹⁹

France is pursuing the EPR2 program, and GE Vernova Hitachi is developing and supplying the BWRX-300. These alone are enough to show that the claim that Westinghouse monopolizes non-Chinese nuclear technology does not hold.²⁰¹⁵

Korea’s position is stronger than that of a simple subcontractor, but more limited than the description of an originating-technology country that independently dominates all markets. The source of Korea’s negotiating leverage is that it is a supplier with both the capability to export Korean-designed reactors and the capability to manufacture and construct foreign designs. However, cost competitiveness at US sites and legal market access must be demonstrated separately.

6. What does a stake in Westinghouse actually buy?

Westinghouse is a US-based company, but its disclosed ownership structure is 49% Cameco and 51% an institutional investor consortium led by Brookfield Renewable. This is not a transaction in which the US government allocates shares in a 100%-state-owned enterprise to Korea.²¹

This distinction matters in negotiations. The US government can exercise influence on the financial, policy, and licensing dimensions, but actually selling existing shares requires an agreement with the owners. The Korean investor has also not been finalized. Equating a nation securing strategic benefits with a specific Korean listed company directly receiving the equity upside from a Westinghouse stake is a mistake.

Figure 8. Three transactions with different destinations for the money

Korea acquires existing sharesPurchases shares from current holders

→

Existing shareholdersReceive sale proceeds

→

What Korea getsAgreed stake and rights
Not automatically construction funding

Korea acquires new sharesCompany issues new stock

→

WestinghouseCompany's cash increases

→

Subject to use commitmentsProject equity, capacity expansion, etc.
Dilutes existing shareholders

Direct investment in a plantEquity or loans to project entity

→

Individual plantConstruction and equipment procurement

→

Suppliers and ownersDelivery payments and power revenues
Construction and power price risks

A diagram illustrating differences in transaction structure. The new-share vs. existing-share split and the investing entity for the current negotiations are not yet determined. All three structures above may be combined in a single investment announcement.

The US loan programs described earlier also require substantial equity commitments from Westinghouse. Therefore, if Korea subscribes for new shares and commits those funds to projects, the capital could accelerate plant execution. On the other hand, if Korea acquires only existing shares, the sale proceeds go in principle to the existing shareholders. A secondary-share transaction also has value if it secures strategic rights, but it should not itself be described as funding for new nuclear construction.

Why Korea’s participation could also benefit the seller

If Korea provides equipment, construction, and financing together, the project’s feasibility may improve. If more nuclear plants actually proceed, Westinghouse gains greater opportunities to earn from design and technology services and long-term fuel and service contracts. Existing shareholders may choose to sell a portion of their stake, recover cash, and increase the value of what remains. This is an analysis of transaction incentives, not a confirmed purpose stated by the current seller.

The seller is not without alternatives either. On 31 July 2026, Cameco announced that Westinghouse had confidentially submitted a draft registration statement to US securities regulators for an initial public offering. The number of shares and the price have not been set. Even if Korea can provide strategic value, there is no guarantee it can buy the stake cheaply.²²

The commitment disclosed by Cameco in October 2025 is structured to support a minimum of $80 billion in nuclear investment. This $80 billion is the scale of plant investment, not the equity value of Westinghouse.²³

The commitment also provides that if the government satisfies conditions including final investment decisions and definitive contracts, it will participate in Westinghouse cash distributions above a defined threshold and hold conditional rights at an IPO. This does not mean the US government already holds 20% of common equity.²³

The same question applies to Korea. If Korea provides capital and industrial capability that enhances the enterprise value for other shareholders, the contribution must be reflected in the share price and commercial contracts. Diplomatic achievement in the form of simply having secured a stake does not by itself validate the economics of the transaction.

The US government's contingent profit participation: the precise meaning of the 20% figure

Under the October 2025 disclosed commitment, the participation right vests only if the US government concludes final investment decisions and definitive contracts for new nuclear construction totaling at least $80 billion. The vested participation right entitles the government to 20% of Westinghouse cash distributions exceeding $17.5 billion after vesting. Additional conditions — including vesting before January 2029 and an anticipated IPO valuation — govern the IPO demand and warrant conversion structure.

This differs from a simple 20% common equity stake. The $17.5 billion threshold here and the $17.5 billion supply chain loan announced by the Department of Energy in June 2026 are the same number but separate items. When evaluating actual dividend, dilution, and exit values for Korean investors, this seniority right and subsequent definitive contracts must be examined together in due diligence.

7. The special significance of nuclear within the broader investment-in-America negotiation

The framework of the November 2025 US–Korea joint fact sheet was $350 billion in total: $150 billion in shipbuilding investment and a $200 billion strategic investment MOU. The strategic investment MOU explicitly stated an annual funding cap of $20 billion and an adjustment mechanism that accounts for foreign exchange market impact. It should not be read as a structure in which the full amount is wired in cash all at once.²⁴

Within this larger negotiation, nuclear is a field in which Korea can offer negotiating assets beyond money. The United States needs a supply chain that can actually complete plants, and Korea wants access to long-term orders and technology and service revenue in exchange for providing capital. Because each side lacks something the other has, room for exchange exists.

From Korea’s perspective, the economic significance breaks into four directions. Dividends and exit gains from equity, value-added from domestic production, supply chain maintenance through repeat overseas orders, and reduced friction costs around nuclear technology. All of these effects depend on contracts, and they overlap with each other, so they should not be simply added together.

For example, labor costs and local subcontractor revenues generated in the United States do not all become Korean GDP even if they are included in a contract value won by a Korean firm. Income from overseas equity and value-added from domestic factories are also separate items. When calculating a nation’s economic gain, total contract value should be decomposed into domestic value-added retained in Korea, net return on overseas investment, and the costs of guarantees and financing.

Nuclear is not unconditionally superior to other investment candidates. If the stake is bought too expensively, domestic volume is limited by local procurement requirements, and Korea ends up absorbing construction losses, even an industrially significant project can become a poor financial investment.

8. What provisions matter more than stake percentage in the negotiation

A 15% stake does not automatically create a board seat. Voting rights at shareholders’ meetings, board participation, consent rights over major decisions, and information access rights are distinct entitlements. What type of shares are purchased, and what is written into the articles of incorporation and shareholders’ agreement, is what matters. Even if Korea becomes a Westinghouse shareholder, existing intellectual property agreements do not change automatically. Westinghouse and KEPCO/KHNP announced a dispute settlement in January 2025, but the official announcement kept the detailed terms of the agreement confidential. I did not treat the royalty or territorial restriction details mentioned in press reports as verified contract text.²⁵

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission design certification for the APR1400 already exists. However, design certification, construction and operating licenses for individual sites, and U.S. regulations on technology exports are separate matters. An equity transaction alone does not eliminate these procedures.²⁶²⁷

Figure 9. Conditions under which equity translates into benefits for Korean companies

Equity and management participationInformation access
Board and major-event rights

→

Separate business agreementsJoint export and procurement scope
Pricing, delivery, and loss sharing

→

Cash remaining in KoreaDelivery, design, and construction profit
Dividends and investment returns

Author's transaction analysis. Equity acquisition alone does not guarantee the middle and right stages.

The specific clauses needed for an investment decision are concrete. One must verify whether Korean companies are guaranteed a certain volume or bidding rights, whether the minimum procurement share is denominated by value or by number of components, and how delivery prices are set. How AP1000 and APR1400 will be jointly offered in which markets is also necessary.

Who bears responsibility when construction costs rise is equally important. If Korea provides completion guarantees without a liability cap, a low equity price or a large contract value may not compensate for that risk. Conversely, if the client bears the costs of design changes and regulatory delays, and Korea is responsible only for the manufacturing and construction scope it can control, the quality of the contract is different.

For equity investors, obligations for additional capital calls, anti-dilution protection, dividend priority, U.S. government pre-participation rights, and post-IPO lock-up restrictions also matter. Transactions where one buys in to gain business rights but ends up only providing liquidity to other shareholders while capital is tied up for a long period should be avoided.

9. How Opportunities Differ Depending on Negotiation Outcomes

Figure 10. Short-term and long-term effects by agreement type

Agreement type	Short-term: announcement to ~3 years	Long-term: thereafter	Investment judgment
Minority equity stake only	Investment deployment, dividend and value appreciation expectations. Services within existing cooperation scope	Equity returns on Westinghouse performance. Expansion of Korean company orders is a separate matter	Closer to a financial investment looking at acquisition price and rights.
Equity + binding business participation	Design services, long-lead equipment orders, production capacity expansion	Recurring main component and construction contracts and follow-on maintenance opportunities	The most direct turning point for Korean listed company performance.
Cooperation framework with repeat orders across multiple countries	Design standardization, supply chain reservations, joint financial procurement	Productivity improvements, lower cost per project, decades of fuel and service opportunities	The largest industrial opportunity. Not a state of guaranteed monopoly or success.
Negotiation delay or unfavorable guarantees	Order delays, reversal of share prices that had priced in expectations	Potential capital burden, construction losses, and loss of existing business opportunities	One must distinguish between a delay to avoid a bad contract and the project itself failing.

These are conditional scenarios without assigned probabilities. The timeframes describe a general business progression sequence and are not a confirmed schedule for the current negotiation.

In the short term, design work and long-lead equipment may move first. Even so, receipt of a down payment is not immediately recognized as full revenue and net profit. One must examine manufacturing progress, delivery and acceptance conditions, and working capital requirements.

For construction companies, revenue scale may grow as construction ramps up. Operations, maintenance, and fuel services may continue for a longer period after completion. However, whether Korean companies capture this long-term revenue depends on separate service agreements. The mere fact that new power plants increase does not automatically benefit all Korean maintenance companies.

10. Can the U.S.-Korea Alliance Lead Non-Chinese Nuclear Expansion

Building a strong supply-side coalition in some key markets is possible, but the assumption of dominating the entire non-Chinese market is excessive.

The path to success is relatively clear. One must create repeatable standard designs and contract structures within the United States, supply equipment with delivery and quality verified through Korean factories, and execute local construction consistently. If costs and schedules are validated on the first project, a virtuous cycle becomes possible in which financing and ordering for subsequent projects becomes easier. This path also aligns with the need for repeat construction and supply chain expansion that the IEA has identified.²

However, the United States also wants its own jobs and supply chain. Even if Korean factories initially supplement insufficient production capacity, demand for U.S. domestic production may intensify over the medium to long term. A path where Korean companies’ overseas profits grow while their domestic export share declines is also possible. This is another reason to view national policy and the investment value of individual companies separately.

The French camp is a competitor, and Japanese and Canadian operators and equipment companies may be both competitors and collaborators. In markets where Russian and Chinese financial offers are available, price and financing terms will continue to matter. Therefore, when evaluating markets, one should start from global nuclear demand and then narrow down to actually accessible volume by working through each country’s technology choices, political relationships, financing, and bidding structure.

Korea also has strategic choices. Expanding participation in the AP1000 supply chain may grow Korean companies’ manufacturing and construction volume, but this does not always align with the direction of independent design and service profits from Korean-type reactors. A collaboration that maintains both the ability to sell Korean-type reactors and the ability to build other designs well is, in terms of long-term negotiating leverage, the better judgment.

11. When Viewing Economic Effects in Numbers, Distinguish Contract Value from Profit

The following is not a forecast for a specific negotiation size. It is an illustrative example showing what variables determine the business profit remaining in Korea under the assumption that a total nuclear project value of 100 trillion won is deployed over 10 years.

The final supply share of Korean companies was varied between 20% and 40%, and the operating margin arising from that share was varied between 5% and 10%. The Korean share here is a figure that does not double-count the total construction amount received by contractors and the domestic equipment delivery value within it.

Figure 11. A 100 trillion won project is not 100 trillion won in Korean company revenue

Assumption	Low participation · margin	Medium participation · margin	High participation · margin
Total project value	100 trillion won	100 trillion won	100 trillion won
Korean final supply share	20%	30%	40%
Korean supply value	20 trillion won	30 trillion won	40 trillion won
Assumed operating margin	5%	8%	10%
10-year cumulative operating profit	1 trillion won	2.4 trillion won	4 trillion won
Simple annual average	100 billion won	240 billion won	400 billion won

All assumptions are illustrative by the author. These are not actual negotiation values, domestic content ratios, or company profit margin forecasts. This is before deducting taxes, financing costs, capital expenditures, and guarantee losses, and differs from cash remaining to shareholders.

The calculation for the middle case is 100 trillion won × 30% × 8% = 2.4 trillion won. The profit is substantial, but it is a 10-year cumulative figure. If one mistakes a large total for a single year’s profit, or allocates the full amount to each listed company individually, the value becomes inflated.

The timing of cash inflows also matters. Assuming 300 billion won in shareholder cash flow per year from 2031 to 2040, the nominal total is 3 trillion won. Discounting this to 2026 at an annual rate of 10% yields approximately 1.26 trillion won. Even the same future earnings are worth less today when the waiting period is long and the cost of capital is high.

The calculation is 0.3 trillion won × Σ[1 ÷ 1.1^t], t = 5 to 14. Because actual projects involve year-by-year capital expenditures, taxes, exchange rates, debt repayment, and minority shareholder shares, a more detailed cash flow analysis is required. Recognizing the long-term growth potential of nuclear energy is different from adding distant future profits to today’s market capitalization without discounting.

12. Can One Argue That Large Upside Has Not Yet Been Priced In

The claim that new opportunities have emerged in the nuclear industry and the claim that nuclear stocks are undervalued require separate verification. Even looking only at recent prices, it is difficult to argue that expectations have not been priced in at all.

From the closing price on September 4, 2026 to the closing price on September 15, Doosan Enerbility rose 9.6%, Hyundai Engineering & Construction rose 7.6%, and Korea Electric Power Corporation Engineering & Construction (KEPCO E&C) rose 37.7%. One cannot attribute all of this period’s movement solely to the equity negotiation, but it is also difficult to argue that the market had no knowledge of the related expectations.²⁸²⁹³⁰

Figure 12. Share price comparison with the September 4 closing price set to 100

Source: AlphaSquare daily closing prices. September 4 = 100, excluding dividends. The vertical axis is displayed from around index 100. This is not a chart measuring the causal effect of negotiation news alone or the degree to which overall nuclear expectations are reflected. On mobile, you can scroll left and right.

Company	Sept 4 closing price	Sept 15 closing price	Period return	Converted market cap
Doosan Enerbility	79,200 won	86,800 won	9.6%	approx. 55.60 trillion won
Hyundai E&C	119,700 won	128,800 won	7.6%	approx. 14.34 trillion won
KEPCO E&C	107,600 won	148,200 won	37.7%	approx. 5.66 trillion won

The converted market capitalization was calculated by multiplying the September 15 closing price by the number of common shares listed at time of inquiry. The share counts are 640,561,146, 111,355,765, and 38,220,000 respectively. This is not a fully diluted value including preferred shares and potential dilution, and is a comparative figure to avoid mixing real-time market cap and P/E ratios from data providers with different timestamps.²⁸²⁹³⁰

How Much Additional Profit in 2035 Would Justify a 10% Higher Value Today

Instead of arbitrarily presenting a price target, one can back-calculate the magnitude of additional profit that would justify further upside.

The assumptions are as follows. Existing business value remains unchanged, and the new nuclear business generates additional sustainable controlling shareholder net profit starting in 2035. A price-to-earnings ratio of 20x is applied to that profit, and it is discounted over 9 years at 10% per year. No dividends before 2035, and no additional share issuance or separate financing burden, are simplifications.

Required additional annual net profit in 2035
= Converted market cap × 10% × (1.10)⁹ ÷ 20

Figure 13. Additional annual profit that explains 10% of current value

Doosan Enerbility

655.5 billion won

Hyundai E&C

169.1 billion won

KEPCO E&C

66.8 billion won

Author's back-calculation. Assumes 20x on 2035 earnings, 10% discount rate, and 9-year period. Not the companies' current P/E, market consensus, or actual earnings forecasts. This is the additional profit beyond existing expectations, and amounts are rounded to the nearest 100 million won.

Working through the Doosan Enerbility calculation: 55.60 trillion won × 10% × 2.3579 ÷ 20 ≈ 0.656 trillion won. The 655.5 billion won is not a total net profit target for 2035, but rather the additional profit that must be layered on top of existing value in this simplified model.

This calculation does not automatically lead to the conclusion that Doosan is overvalued. The current share price also reflects other businesses and profits from earlier periods. Conversely, it shows that one cannot assume significant upside remains simply because a company is the most important player in the industry.

If the multiple applicable in 2035 is 30x, the required additional profit shrinks to two-thirds of the table figure. If profits materialize earlier or the cost of capital falls, the present value also grows. However, applying both a high multiple and a low discount rate optimistically at the same time amounts to underestimating risk twice.

In an actual valuation of Doosan, one must separate the energy business and subsidiary stakes, net debt, and non-controlling interests. For Hyundai E&C, profits and losses from non-nuclear construction businesses must be viewed together, and for KEPCO E&C, one must verify how many design personnel can be added to convert into revenue. A full fair-value assessment combining each company’s same-date disclosed financials and consensus estimates was not included in this calculation.

Any remaining upside comes not from the 400 GW figure itself, but from contract terms better than the market expected, faster repeat orders, and higher cash profits. Based on current information alone, I do not judge that this is significantly unpriced across all nuclear stocks.

13. Who Are the Largest Listed Korean Beneficiary Companies

Doosan Enerbility: The Manufacturing Company with the Broadest Potential Participation

Doosan Enerbility sits at the center of industrial beneficiaries. The company has manufacturing capability for major components of large nuclear reactors and a track record of overseas supply, with experience participating not only in Korean nuclear supply chains but also in the U.S. nuclear supply chain. The company has disclosed its record of supplying nuclear components for the U.S. Vogtle Units 3 and 4.³¹³²

This strength differs from a structure where a single reactor design must capture the entire market before any benefit is realized. In August 2026, the company also announced a contract to manufacture major structural components for TerraPower’s first Natrium project. It can access manufacturing demand for both large conventional reactors and certain next-generation reactor designs.³³

This does not mean Doosan is the only company in the world capable of manufacturing these components. Expanding production capacity requires capital investment, skilled labor, and quality control. Even as orders grow, working capital and capacity expansion costs may come first in the early stages. The metrics to watch are not only the growth in nuclear-related order backlog, but also the profit margins and operating cash flow that those orders generate.

Doosan also participates in business in China. In July 2026, the company announced a contract to supply large forgings for the Laiyang project in China. It is therefore inaccurate to characterize the company’s growth solely as a beneficiary of China exclusion.³⁴

Hyundai E&C: Large Construction Opportunity, Risk Allocation Equally Important

Hyundai E&C has a direct opportunity when the scale of nuclear construction business expands significantly. The engineering contract for Bulgaria’s Kozloduy Units 7 and 8 with Westinghouse, and early design participation in U.S. projects, demonstrate a real path of cooperation. However, early design and engineering contracts should not be extrapolated into confirmed revenue from full EPC contracts.³⁵

The question that will determine Hyundai E&C’s upside potential goes beyond construction volume. It is necessary to verify whether the client compensates for cost overruns, who pays for design change costs, and whether there are caps on liquidated damages and warranty liability. If these terms are favorable, large orders can translate into profit; if unfavorable, the lessons of the 2017 Westinghouse case must be recalled.

KEPCO E&C: Large Change from Small Earnings Base Is Possible, but Rights Are Needed

KEPCO E&C has high involvement in business tied to Korean nuclear design, so the change relative to existing earnings can be large when additional design volume converts into results. However, increased AP1000 construction does not mean Westinghouse’s technology royalties accrue to KEPCO E&C.

Profitability differs depending on whether it is additional export of Korean-type reactors, partial design services for AP1000, or a scope of design that can be repeated over the long term. The company has a history of announcing participation in the U.S. nuclear design market, but past contracts do not guarantee participation rights across the entire current business.³⁶

It should also be noted that this company had the largest share price reaction among the three companies since early September. The back-calculated figure of KRW 66.8 billion in additional earnings by 2035 being smaller than Doosan’s does not make it easier to achieve. It requires time and labor costs to increase skilled design personnel, as well as an actual scope of orders.

Figure 14. The benefits and conditions to verify differ by company

Company	Most Favorable Opportunity	Evidence That Confirms Value	Key Caution
Doosan Enerbility 034020	Major component and manufacturing demand for large reactors and multiple designs	Binding orders, adequate margins, cash recovery after capacity expansion	Already large enterprise value, expansion costs, working capital, and delivery liability
Hyundai E&C 000720	Large-scale nuclear construction contracts	Conversion from early design to full EPC contract, reasonable risk allocation	Cost overruns and unlimited warranty, losses in non-nuclear business
KEPCO E&C 052690	Large change relative to existing earnings from additional orders	Repeatable design scope, staffing, and service unit price secured	Confusion with AP1000 royalties, staffing constraints, pre-priced expectations
KEPCO KPS 051600	Long-term maintenance and services after completion	Actual scope and profitability of overseas maintenance contracts	Time until new reactors complete, competition with local operators
KEPCO 015760	Indirect benefit through KHNP and other project structures, potential investment participation	Confirmation of investing entity, profit allocation, and guarantee limits	Costs of national strategy and listed-company shareholder returns may diverge

This represents the author's conditional industrial and investment judgment. It is not a return ranking or a buy price target. Comparison of companies beyond the core three is based on business role and is not a complete valuation of individual companies.

Under this framework, the broadest manufacturing beneficiary is Doosan Enerbility, the opportunity for large construction contracts belongs to Hyundai E&C, and the possibility of large change relative to existing earnings lies with KEPCO E&C. The certainty of benefit and the magnitude of share price appreciation do not follow the same order.

14. What New Developments Would Change the Judgment

Figure 15. Six stages through which a policy announcement becomes shareholder cash

1 · Policy · MOUIntent and direction to proceed

2 · Confirmed ContractEquity price, business rights, guarantees

3 · Final Investment DecisionSite, power purchase, financing

4 · Order PlacementAmount, scope, and delivery schedule per company

5 · Earnings RecognitionCosts, schedule, loss provisions

6 · Cash RecoveryCash exceeding investment and working capital

This diagram illustrates the process by which enterprise value is confirmed in stages. In practice, some stages may overlap or occur out of order. It is important not to calculate an announcement at an earlier stage as confirmed earnings at a later stage.

Evidence that would raise the assessment positively includes binding procurement volumes for Korean companies, repeat order schedules, construction contracts with limited risk, and the scope of cooperation between Korean-type reactors and AP1000. If actual production, profit margins, and cash recovery follow, the value of long-term growth is reinforced.

Conversely, the assessment should be lowered if only the equity acquisition amount is large while business rights remain vague, if there are many nuclear candidate sites but no power purchase agreements or final financing commitments, or if Korean companies guarantee against design changes and policy delays. The same applies if new equity contributions and capacity expansion burdens only grow while share prices rise ahead of orders.

The opportunity where U.S. nuclear reconstruction meets Korean manufacturing and construction capability is significant. The conditions for converting that opportunity into a good investment are clear. Korea must secure business rights and cash earnings in proportion to the capital and liability it contributes, and the present value of those additional earnings must exceed the expectations already priced into the shares. Judgment should be based on the rights and obligations in the contract documents and subsequent per-company order disclosures, not on announcement dates.

Sources and Calculation Basis

Government targets were distinguished from actual results. Company plans were distinguished from confirmed contracts, and press reports of negotiations were not treated as official agreements. For technical, policy, and corporate business facts, government and company public disclosures were prioritized. Share prices used historical daily closing prices from an external data provider and were not mixed with real-time indicators. All explanatory economic models separately stated their assumptions.

Negotiation terms and share prices are subject to change. If the actual text of undisclosed equity agreements, shareholder agreements, or construction contracts is confirmed, economic assessments must also change accordingly. This analysis does not substitute for individual trading decisions.

White House, 2025-05-23, Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Total capacity target of 400GW by 2050, up from approximately 100GW in 2024. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
IEA, 2025, The Path to a New Era for Nuclear Energy: Executive summary. Design origin of 52 reactors that began construction 2017–2024 and execution constraints in the nuclear industry. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, 2026-09-15, Specific details of nuclear projects including Westinghouse equity acquisition remain undecided. ↩︎ ↩︎
Yonhap News Agency, 2026-09-16 11:32, Government ahead of nuclear investment, tug-of-war with U.S. over Westinghouse equity stake. Only reporting on equity stake and negotiation developments was used; undisclosed terms of any private agreement were not adopted as verified contracts. ↩︎
Hankyung, 2026-09-16 11:27 · revised 11:35, Congressional briefing on U.S. investment canceled… Sept. 18 Korea-U.S. MOU likely delayed. ↩︎
White House, 2025-05-23, Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base. 5GW uprate and target to begin construction on 10 large reactors by 2030. ↩︎
U.S. Department of Energy, 2024-11-12, U.S. Sets Targets to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050. Used only for historical comparison of prior policy targets. ↩︎
U.S. Department of Energy, 2026-06-23, Department of Energy Announces American Nuclear Supply Chain Loans. Conditional $17.5 billion loan, $500 million equity commitment per side per project, up to 5 projects. ↩︎ ↩︎
U.S. Department of Energy, December 23, 1957: Shippingport. ↩︎
Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, Kori Nuclear Power Site, Nuclear Facility Status. Commercial operation and reactor type of Kori Unit 1. ↩︎
Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, UAE Nuclear Power Plant Project. Commercial operation dates for Barakah Units 1–4. ↩︎
Westinghouse, 2017-03-29, Westinghouse Announces Strategic Restructuring. ↩︎
IEA, 2026, Key Questions on Energy and AI: Executive summary. Data centers 485TWh in 2025 and 950TWh in 2030; uncertainty in demand, efficiency, and infrastructure. CC BY 4.0. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
IEA, 2025, Energy and AI: Energy supply for AI. Data center power supply by generation source and timing. ↩︎
GE Vernova, 2026-08-13, Blue Energy, GE Vernova and Hitachi launch next phase of gas-plus-nuclear project. Business plans and final investment decision targets are not realized operating capacity. ↩︎ ↩︎
Rosatom, Belarus nuclear plant fuel supply and roles of TVEL and ASE. ↩︎
OSW, 2026-01-14, The uncertain future of Rosatom’s nuclear technology exports. Policy research on Russia’s overseas business and financial structure. ↩︎
CNNC, 2025-05-12, Hualong nuclear power-related announcement; Chinese Government, 2022-03-25, Hualong nuclear power project. Promotional language regarding company superiority was not used as an analytical premise. ↩︎
CNNC, 2025-03-13, Contracts signed for first two Bailong units. SPIC, SNERDI, and CAP1000 project structure. ↩︎
EDF, 2026-03-12, French nuclear industry stakeholders welcome outcomes of the fifth Nuclear Policy Council; EDF, 2025-11-05, EPR2 programme supplier contracts. ↩︎
Cameco, Westinghouse business and ownership. Cameco 49%, institutional investor consortium led by Brookfield Renewable 51%. ↩︎
Cameco, 2026-07-31, Westinghouse’s confidential submission of draft registration statement. ↩︎
Cameco, 2025-10-28, Partnership with United States Government. Minimum $80 billion nuclear investment and conditional profit participation structure. Power plant investment and equity value were distinguished. ↩︎ ↩︎
White House, 2025-11-13, Joint Fact Sheet on President Trump’s Meeting with President Lee. Shipbuilding $150 billion, strategic investment $200 billion, annual funding cap, and foreign exchange market adjustment provisions. ↩︎
Westinghouse, 2025-01-16, Global Settlement Agreement with KEPCO and KHNP. Detailed terms are not public. ↩︎
U.S. NRC, APR1400 Design Certification. Distinction between design certification and site-specific licensing. ↩︎
U.S. Department of Energy · NNSA, 10 CFR Part 810. Export controls applicable to technical assistance and transfers. Does not substitute for transaction-specific legal review. ↩︎
AlphaSquare, Doosan Enerbility 034020. Daily closing prices September 4–15 and common shares outstanding, accessed 2026-09-16. Closing price sequence in the chart: 79,200 / 87,900 / 89,500 / 91,700 / 89,900 / 90,800 / 85,600 / 86,800 KRW. ↩︎ ↩︎
AlphaSquare, Hyundai E&C 000720. Closing price sequence for the same dates: 119,700 / 126,900 / 131,400 / 133,600 / 131,200 / 134,900 / 125,500 / 128,800 KRW. ↩︎ ↩︎
AlphaSquare, KEPCO E&C 052690. Closing price sequence for the same dates: 107,600 / 122,300 / 142,600 / 143,100 / 145,000 / 152,000 / 134,400 / 148,200 KRW. Period return was calculated as last closing price ÷ first closing price − 1. ↩︎ ↩︎
Doosan Enerbility, 2019-05-10, Strategic cooperation with NuScale Power. Only the Vogtle component supply history was used from this past announcement. The NuScale completion target at that time was not used as a current forecast. ↩︎
Doosan Enerbility, Large-Scale Nuclear Components. ↩︎
Doosan Enerbility, 2026-08-14, TerraPower Natrium major structural component manufacturing contract. ↩︎
Doosan Enerbility, 2026-07-27, Laiyang nuclear plant large forgings supply contract. ↩︎
Hyundai E&C, 2026-04-13, Official materials on global nuclear business. The Bulgaria engineering contract and U.S. early design work were distinguished from confirmed revenue on the main construction contract. ↩︎
KEPCO E&C, 2008-04-02, Company announcement on participation in U.S. nuclear design market. Used only to confirm past participation experience and not as current new business orders. ↩︎

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