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Pearl Abyss Target Price Gap: Why Shinhan's 2027 Sales Cliff Looks Too Harsh

Wed, 29 Apr 2026 13:45:00 +0900

📚 Pearl Abyss and Crimson Desert investment research hub collects the full thread: unit sales, Patch 1.04, platform re-rating, KRW 60,000 support, Shinhan’s target-price gap, and the CCP/EVE divestiture.

This is the closing installment of the series — at least for the run-up to the May 1Q26 earnings release. The most recent prior installments: Retail → Institutional Handoff at ₩60K, Post-Patch Weekend Data, Platform Re-rating, Patch 1.04 Witcher Moment, 1Q26 Earnings Preview, Short-Sale Absorption, Sell-Side Consensus Gap, 5M Franchise Re-rating. This installment dissects where the April 29 Shinhan Securities report (75.6% target-price upgrade) aligns with and diverges from our 1Q26 model — the anatomy of the ₩49.7B operating-profit gap, the meaning of the ₩72,000 target, and our framework through the May earnings release.

Executive Summary

Shinhan Securities raised its Pearl Abyss target price on April 29 from ₩41,000 to ₩72,000, a 75.6% increase. Its 1Q26 operating profit estimate of ₩254.7B is more than double the market consensus of approximately ₩125.0B.
Relative to our April 21 base case (revenue ₩395.0B, operating profit ₩205.0B, OPM 51.9%), the gap is +₩38.5B in revenue, +₩49.7B in operating profit, and +6.9%p in OPM. But the key variable is not unit volume. Shinhan assumes 3.7 million units recognized in 1Q — 250,000 units more conservative than our 3.95 million — yet still arrives at 24% higher operating profit.
The gap is entirely a margin story. At its core is a single line: marketing expenses of ₩19.7B. This is approximately ₩10.0B below our assumption of ₩30.0B, and this one line explains roughly one-fifth of the operating profit gap. Revenue recognition efficiency (implied ASP of approximately ₩91,000 per unit for Crimson Desert vs. our ₩79,800) explains the remainder.
Bottom line: it is a positive event that mainstream sell-side has for the first time officially reflected a 1Q surprise in published numbers. However, the ₩72,000 target represents only the upper bound of our normalization range (₩68,000–₩72,000) — it falls short of our primary fair value (₩75,000), our 8.5M validation price (approximately ₩79,700), and our bull scenario (₩86,000+). Hold, no new buys, begin scaling down near ₩75,000, actively take profits above ₩86,000. The framework is unchanged from April 21.

1. Conclusion First

The key figures from Shinhan Securities’ April 29 report are summarized in a single table.

Item	Shinhan Estimate
Target price	₩72,000
Rating	Buy (maintained)
1Q26 revenue	₩433.5B
1Q26 operating profit	₩254.7B
1Q26 OPM	58.7%
1Q Crimson Desert units recognized	3.70 million
1Q marketing expenses	₩19.7B
12M forward EPS	₩4,813
Applied P/E	15x
FY26 operating profit	₩473.3B
FY27 operating profit	₩117.0B
Dokkaebi launch assumption	Q2 2028

This report carries three implications for the market.

First, the 1Q operating profit consensus will soon break down. Shinhan has put ₩254.7B on record as an official number, and it is highly likely that other brokerages will revise their estimates upward in rapid succession before the May earnings release. The gap versus the ₩125.0B consensus is simply too wide to ignore.

Second, the ₩72,000 target is not a ceiling. In our price matrix, it represents the upper end of the normalization range — not our primary fair value (₩75,000), not the 8.5M validation price (approximately ₩79,700), and not the bull scenario (₩86,000+). Shinhan’s view is a price level “explainable by a 1Q earnings reset alone.”

Third, Shinhan’s bear argument is the 2027 new-title drought. It projects FY26 operating profit at ₩473.3B but FY27 at only ₩117.0B — 25% below consensus of approximately ₩155.0B. This is an explicit V-shaped model: “2026 peak → 2027 cliff → 2028 Dokkaebi recovery.” It is also what we view as the model’s single biggest vulnerability.

The conclusion is therefore simple. Hold. No new buys. Begin planned scaling-down near ₩75,000. The Shinhan report reinforces our thesis; it does not provide a new entry rationale.

2. Shinhan Model vs. Internal Model: 1Q26 Gap Decomposition

2.1 Headline Gap

Item	Shinhan	Internal Base	Gap	Gap %
1Q26 revenue	₩433.5B	₩395.0B	+₩38.5B	+9.7%
1Q26 operating profit	₩254.7B	₩205.0B	+₩49.7B	+24.2%
1Q26 OPM	58.7%	51.9%	+6.9%p	—

Arithmetic check:

Revenue gap = 433.5 − 395.0 = ₩38.5B Revenue gap % = 38.5 / 395.0 = 9.7%

Operating profit gap = 254.7 − 205.0 = ₩49.7B Operating profit gap % = 49.7 / 205.0 = 24.2%

Shinhan OPM = 254.7 / 433.5 = 58.7% Internal OPM = 205.0 / 395.0 = 51.9% OPM gap = 58.7 − 51.9 = 6.9%p

Key observation: the operating profit gap (24.2%) is 2.5× wider than the revenue gap (9.7%). This means Shinhan’s model is not a bet on aggressive unit volume — it is a bet on aggressive margin assumptions.

2.2 Unit Volume Gap — Shinhan Is More Conservative Than We Are

Interestingly, Shinhan’s assumed 1Q recognized unit volume is actually lower than ours.

Item	Shinhan	Internal Base	Gap
1Q recognized units	3.70 million	3.95 million	−250K (−6.3%)

Pearl Abyss officially announced cumulative sales of 4 million units as of April 1 and 5 million units as of April 15. Our model assumes 3.95 million units on the basis that cumulative sales were very close to 4 million at the March 31 accounting cut-off. Shinhan is 250,000 units more conservative than that.

Key insight: Shinhan assumes lower volume (Q) but more favorable unit economics (P) and cost structure (C) — two different paths to a similar operating profit level. Our model: high Q × conservative C. Shinhan’s model: conservative Q × aggressive C.

2.3 Revenue Recognition Efficiency — Shinhan Is Closer to Gross Presentation

If we back out legacy IP (BDO + EVE) revenue from Shinhan’s ₩433.5B total, using the same ₩97.0B assumption as our model, the implied Crimson Desert ASP is as follows:

Crimson Desert revenue ≈ 433.5 − 97.0 = ₩336.5B Implied ASP ≈ ₩336.5B / 3.70M = approximately ₩91,000 per unit

Compared with our internal scenario (3.95M × ₩79,800 + ₩97.0B = ₩412.2B, less a ₩17.2B safety margin = ₩395.0B), Shinhan’s implied per-unit revenue recognition is approximately ₩11,000 higher.

This discrepancy suggests one of two possibilities:

Shinhan assumes pure gross revenue recognition only — i.e., it does not adopt the hypothesis that console revenue is partially recognized on a net basis.
Alternatively, Shinhan assumes lower legacy IP revenue (in the ₩80–90B range), thereby attributing a larger share of total revenue to Crimson Desert.

Either way, the answer will be confirmed once the principal-agent accounting treatment is disclosed in the May earnings footnotes. This is precisely the point we flagged in our 1Q26 preview as “the key variable in 1Q26 is not unit volume but accounting methodology.”

2.4 The Key Cost Line: Marketing Expenses of ₩19.7B

Shinhan’s 1Q marketing expense estimate is ₩19.7B. In historical context:

Period	Marketing Expenses
1Q25 (prior year)	₩7.3B
4Q25 (prior quarter)	₩12.3B
1Q26 Shinhan estimate	₩19.7B
1Q26 internal base assumption	₩30.0B

Shinhan’s ₩19.7B implies roughly +60% quarter-over-quarter growth from 4Q25. While plausible, we view it as aggressive for the following reasons:

Global simultaneous launch marketing scale. A simultaneous global release across PC and four console platforms implies global PR and advertising spend where ₩20.0B represents a floor, not a midpoint.
Second-wave marketing push. Influencer campaigns and global PR follow-ups immediately after the April launch may be partially recognized in 1Q.
Quarter-end concentration of launch-adjacent ad spend. Accounting convention typically concentrates such expenses at quarter-end.

If actual marketing expenses come in at ₩25.0B, Shinhan’s OP estimate declines by ₩5.3B. At ₩30.0B, it declines by ₩10.3B. This single line explains approximately 20% of the ₩49.7B operating profit gap.

2.5 Gap Decomposition Summary — Two Lines

A rough decomposition of the ₩49.7B operating profit gap is as follows:

Gap Driver	Direction of OP Impact
Revenue recognition efficiency (+₩11K/unit implied ASP, gross recognition)	OP +approximately ₩30–37B (after netting platform fees)
Marketing expenses (−₩10.3B)	OP +approximately ₩10B
Other cost lines (headcount / D&A / miscellaneous estimation differences)	OP +approximately ₩5–10B
Total	OP +approximately ₩47–57B (consistent with actual gap of ₩49.7B)

In short, the two primary drivers of the ₩49.7B operating profit gap are revenue recognition methodology and marketing expenses. Both will be verified in the May earnings footnotes. All other assumption differences are residual.

3. FY26 / FY27 Gap — Shinhan’s 2027 Cliff Is Too Linear

3.1 Shinhan’s Annual Operating Profit Path

Year	Shinhan OP	Market Consensus	Internal Scenario
FY26E	₩473.3B	—	Bear ₩360B / Base ₩410B / Bull ₩480B
FY27E	₩117.0B	approximately ₩155.0B	No finalized model

Noteworthy: Shinhan’s FY26 operating profit estimate (₩473.3B) is virtually identical to our bull scenario (₩480B). Yet Shinhan’s target of ₩72,000 is below our primary fair value of ₩75,000. The reason is singular: the FY27 cliff.

3.2 Shinhan’s FY27 Assumptions and Weaknesses

Shinhan’s ₩117.0B FY27 operating profit projection rests on the following assumptions:

Dokkaebi launches in Q2 2028 → no new-title revenue in FY27.
Plan 8 timeline undetermined → conservatively modeled as zero contribution.
Crimson Desert long-tail revenue decays sharply in 2027.
DLC, expansion packs, and multiplayer mode incremental revenue assumed near zero.

This model has two notable weaknesses.

Weakness 1 — Undervaluation of Crimson Desert post-launch revenue optionality

Crimson Desert is not a base-game-only title. A natural revenue lifecycle of base game → patches/updates → DLC/expansions → multiplayer → season passes is entirely plausible. Given Pearl Abyss’s decade of live-service expertise from Black Desert Online and the expanded user base from simultaneous console launches, modeling 2027 follow-on revenue as converging to zero is an aggressive bear assumption.

Weakness 2 — Zero option value for BlackSpace Engine

Shinhan’s ₩72,000 target applies 15x P/E to 12M forward EPS of ₩4,813. This multiple represents a “single-IP, 12-month earnings only” valuation framework. Excluded entirely are:

Potential external licensing revenue from BlackSpace Engine.
Option value of Dokkaebi / Plan 8 (future IP diversification).
Structural re-rating as a multi-IP studio (15x → 18–20x P/E).

Shinhan treats all of these items purely as discount factors embedded in the “FY27 drought.” Downside is priced in; upside optionality is assigned zero. Conservative, but asymmetric in our view.

3.3 How We Track FY27

We have not built a finalized FY27 model. Instead, we monitor three checkpoints:

6M global cumulative: Announcement likely around September 2026. Crossing 6M raises confidence in the 8.5M trajectory.
8.5M validation: Late 2026 to early 2027. Crossing 8.5M makes entry into the approximately ₩79,700 validation price natural.
Dokkaebi / Plan 8 announcement timeline: Any official schedule announcement at any point in 2027 would serve as a P/E re-rating trigger.

If any one of these three checkpoints is met, Shinhan’s FY27 assumption of ₩117.0B will prove too low.

4. The Position of the ₩72,000 Target — Upper Bound of Normalization, Not a Ceiling

4.1 Price Matrix

Price Range	Our Classification	Relationship to Shinhan Target
₩60,000–₩63,000	Conservative fair value	12–17% upside to Shinhan target
₩68,000–₩72,000	Normalization range	Shinhan target reached
₩74,000–₩76,000	Primary fair value	+3–6% above Shinhan target
₩79,000–₩80,500	8.5M validation price	+10–12% above Shinhan target
₩86,000+	Bull scenario	+19%+ above Shinhan target

The ₩72,000 target sits precisely at the upper end of our normalization range. Shinhan has priced in “a 1Q earnings reset and nothing more.” The 8.5M crossing, the 6M announcement, and BlackSpace Engine option value are not in this price.

4.2 Price-Level Factor Framework

Price Range	Factor read
₩60,000–₩63,000	Data confirmation zone, especially sub-₩20B marketing spend and 6M unit trajectory.
₩68,000–₩72,000	Shinhan target zone; reaching it is not thesis invalidation, but further upside needs new evidence.
₩74,000–₩76,000	Internal fair value center; margin and accounting quality become more important.
₩79,000–₩80,500	8.5M unit trajectory needs stronger support.
₩86,000+	Platform-option valuation requires clear BlackSpace / DokeV / long-tail evidence.

The no-new-buys rule stands. Until the May earnings release, there is no way to determine whether Shinhan’s estimate (₩254.7B) or ours (₩205.0B) is correct. Adding to the position in the interim is a bet without data.

4.3 Invalidation Conditions (Unchanged)

We would lower our base case if any of the following occur:

1Q26 operating profit at or below ₩170.0B (bottom of our bear scenario).
OPM below 45%.
2Q sell-through deteriorates faster than expected (e.g., Crimson Desert falls outside the global top-30 sales ranking, concurrent users settle below 50,000).
8.5M trajectory impaired (cumulative sales below 6M by June).
Earnings footnotes confirm net revenue recognition for console sales exceeds 50%.

None of these conditions have materialized as of April 29. Base case maintained.

5. May Earnings Release D-Day Checklist

Six items to verify before Pearl Abyss reports 1Q26 results in May:

Revenue recognition footnotes. Principal-agent accounting treatment; gross vs. net recognition for console revenue.
Advertising and promotional expenses (actual). Shinhan ₩19.7B vs. our ₩30.0B — which is right.
Commission and platform fees (actual). Moves in the same direction as revenue recognition methodology; read together with item 1.
Legacy IP revenue (BDO + EVE). Validates our ₩97.0B assumption.
2Q guidance tone. How management characterizes 2Q revenue patterns following the 1Q peak.
Conference call references to new-title schedules. Dokkaebi, Plan 8, Crimson Desert DLC.

Items 1 and 2 are the most important.

Scenario A (Shinhan direction confirmed): If item 1 confirms pure gross recognition and item 2 comes in at or below ₩20.0B, Shinhan’s ₩433.5B / ₩254.7B is validated. This would mean our model was conservative, and further upside into the high ₩70,000s opens naturally. Even so, our position that anything above ₩80,000 requires separate validation (6M, 8.5M, engine optionality) remains unchanged.
Scenario B (our direction confirmed): If item 1 confirms mixed recognition or item 2 comes in at ₩25.0–33.0B, Shinhan’s OP estimate falls by ₩10.0–20.0B. The market reads it as “beat consensus but not as much as Shinhan.” Stabilization within the normalization range (₩68,000–₩72,000) would be the natural outcome.

In either scenario, the first tranche of scale-down near ₩75,000 operates identically. That is the key point. Our first sell target does not change regardless of which model proves correct.

6. One Final Line

Shinhan Securities’ April 29 report is the first document in which our thesis has been translated into sell-side language. It illustrates two different paths to the same operating profit destination — ours (high Q × conservative C) versus theirs (conservative Q × aggressive C) — but the May earnings release determines which path was correct.

The ₩72,000 target is the price of a “1Q earnings reset.” It is not the price of “8.5M crossed + engine option value reflected.” Hold, no new buys, begin scaling down near ₩75,000, actively take profits above ₩86,000. The framework is exactly the same as April 21.

This series closes here for now. The next post will come after the May earnings release — once we know which model was right — as the opening of a new series.

Disclaimer: For research and information purposes only. Not investment advice. Names cited are for analytical illustration; readers should perform their own due diligence and consult licensed advisors before any investment decision.

Pearl Abyss 1Q26 Preview: 51.9% Margin Case After Crimson Desert

Tue, 21 Apr 2026 15:00:00 +0900

📚 Series 5/6: Pearl Abyss × Crimson Desert Thesis — series hub →

This post is the fifth entry in the series. Previously: 5M milestone and franchise re-rating, sell-side consensus gap, initial thesis, and the BDO second-order catalyst the market missed. This entry is the forward-looking one: what should the 1Q26 consolidated print actually look like, given the official sales milestones and the 4Q25 cost base we already know?

TL;DR

Central estimate: Pearl Abyss 1Q26 consolidated revenue KRW 395.0B, operating profit KRW 205.0B, OPM 51.9%.
Core logic: Given the company’s official “4 million units by April 1” headline, the most reasonable 1Q-recognized unit count is ~3.95 million, and legacy IP (BDO + EVE) lands around KRW 97.0B reflecting the steady base shown in 4Q25. But the real 1Q26 swing variable is not the unit count — it’s revenue-recognition frame (principal vs. agent), realized ASP, and the marketing / commission expense lines.
Key uncertainty: Until the 1Q26 quarterly report footnotes confirm principal/agent treatment, actual platform mix, and actual marketing expense, the estimate retains error bands. This is the most defensible externally-shareable central case, not a point forecast.

1. Bottom line

Final 1Q26 consolidated estimate:

Line	Central case
Revenue	KRW 395.0B
Operating profit	KRW 205.0B
OPM	51.9%

Lower than the aggressive gross-only framing (KRW 430B / 223B) but meaningfully above a purely conservative mixed-recognition read (KRW 385B / 195B). The central value is chosen for external defensibility: it survives the widest range of footnote outcomes without being embarrassed in either direction.

2. Facts — externally verifiable anchors

2.1 Base from the legacy business

For FY2025 (consolidated): revenue KRW 365.6B, operating loss KRW 14.8B. 4Q25: revenue KRW 95.5B, operating loss KRW 8.4B. Legacy IP revenue in 4Q25 was Black Desert KRW 63.0B + EVE KRW 27.3B. 4Q25 operating-cost composition: labor KRW 50.7B, commissions KRW 19.2B, marketing KRW 12.3B. Those numbers are the direct base for the 1Q26 cost stack.

2.2 Crimson Desert official milestones

Crimson Desert launched March 20, 2026, and Pearl Abyss officially announced 4M units by April 1 and 5M units by April 15. These two official figures are the most important anchors for the 1Q26 estimate. “4M by April 1” means cumulative sales had reached very near 4M at the March 31 accounting cutoff.

2.3 User metrics and long-tail state

After launch, Crimson Desert held up meaningfully on Steam concurrency, reviews, and sales rank. Steam CCU peak 276,261 on March 30. April 9–13 data showed sustained Global top rankings, sustained US/China sales-rank presence, and improving recent-review positivity. By April 17: 24h peak 111.4K, current CCU 79.4K, global sales rank #4 — this is not a “collapse,” it is normal decay from an exceptional opening. The 1Q26 print will be strong; annualizing 1Q into an FY model is a separate, more cautious judgment.

2.4 Accounting-treatment facts and open items

Internal project notes and external references lean toward the view that Pearl Abyss treats platform commissions as a separately-booked Commissions expense and reports revenue closer to a gross basis. There is also prior analysis citing that console revenue recognition has been switched from gross to net in a past precedent. The R&D capitalization trail (FY2024 R&D KRW 132.9B; 1H25 R&D KRW 61.2B; intangibles drawdown) supports the view that the bulk of Crimson Desert development cost is already embedded in historical P&L. These are directional reads, not confirmed footnote facts for 1Q26.

3. Assumptions — the actual premises behind this estimate

Not facts. These are the premises reviewers should agree or disagree with.

3.1 Crimson Desert 1Q recognized units: 3.95M

Against the April 1 official print of 4M, placing cutoff-day cumulative sales closer to 3.95M than to 3.90M is the most reasonable read. A 4.00M full adoption is aggressive; 3.85M is too conservative. Central case: 3.95M.

3.2 Platform mix: PC 52% / Console 48%

No disclosure exists. The most contested assumption. PS Store top-ranking evidence argues for higher console weight; SteamDB CCU and review volume argue for higher PC weight. Rather than force one side, the central case uses PC 52% / Console 48% — enough to respect “PC-leaning likely” without discarding “strong console signal.”

3.3 Realized ASP (accounting basis): ~KRW 79.8k

The aggressive gross-only frame puts ASP at KRW 83.5k. The mixed-recognition conservative view drops realized ASP into the low KRW 70k’s. The central case is neither: weighting units, platform mix, and regional pricing, ~KRW 79.8k (effectively ≈KRW 80k) — “keep a gross-leaning reported revenue stance, but don’t take the full KRW 83.5k full adoption.”

3.4 Legacy IP revenue: KRW 97.0B

4Q25 legacy revenue was KRW 95.5B. BDO 10th-anniversary events and EVE’s steady base put KRW 93.0B slightly low and KRW 100.0B near the upper end. Central case: KRW 97.0B.

3.5 Labor: KRW 52.0B

4Q25 labor was KRW 50.7B including one-off restructuring and QA-staffing expansion; 1Q25 was KRW 49.0B. 1Q26 is a launch quarter with ops / CS / patch-response staffing, but overshooting 4Q materially would be aggressive. Central case: KRW 52.0B — realistic vs. 49.0B, conservative vs. 54.5B.

3.6 Marketing: KRW 30.0B

This is the single biggest OP swing factor. A KRW 14.0B assumption is clearly too low; KRW 34.0B is the upper end. A KRW 25.0B plausible mid-case is reasonable, but vs. 4Q25’s 12.3B and 1Q25’s 7.3B, a AAA launch quarter can easily run above that. Central case: KRW 30.0B — the most defensible mid-value.

3.7 Commissions: KRW 76.0B

This line swings strongly with the recognition frame. Under gross-only, it can reach KRW 87.5B; under heavier mixed-recognition, it drops to ~KRW 70.0B. Crucially, the OP impact is partially offset by the revenue-recognition choice — commissions and reported revenue move together. Central case: KRW 76.0B, between the gross-only and mixed views.

3.8 D&A + other: KRW 32.0B

4Q25: D&A KRW 5.9B + other KRW 15.8B = KRW 21.7B. A launch quarter adds server, CS, logistics, outsourcing, and patch-response costs, but pushing to KRW 34.5B is aggressive; KRW 23.0B is too low. Central case: KRW 32.0B.

4. The math

4.1 Crimson Desert revenue

Recognized units: 3.95M
Realized ASP: KRW 79.8k

→ 3.95M × 79.8k = KRW 315.2B

4.2 Total revenue (gross calculation)

Crimson Desert: KRW 315.2B
Legacy IP: KRW 97.0B
Calculated: KRW 412.2B

For an externally-shareable central case, a ~KRW 17.2B safety margin is subtracted to reflect the March 31 cutoff cadence and principal/agent uncertainty:

→ KRW 412.2B calc → KRW 395.0B central case

The distinction matters: the calculated upper is the “book math on gross-leaning premises”; the central case is the externally-defensible number.

4.3 Operating costs

Labor: KRW 52.0B
Marketing: KRW 30.0B
Commissions: KRW 76.0B
D&A + other: KRW 32.0B
Total: KRW 190.0B

4.4 Operating profit

Revenue: KRW 395.0B
Costs: KRW 190.0B
OP: KRW 205.0B

4.5 OPM

205.0 ÷ 395.0 = 51.9%

Final central case:

Revenue: KRW 395.0B
Operating profit: KRW 205.0B
OPM: 51.9%

5. Why this frame

5.1 Accounting structure matters more than the unit count

The 1Q26 print is less about “is the game good” than about which accounting frame captures revenue, and where the costs land. Some internal models land at KRW 430B / 223B, but the more important driver is revenue-recognition treatment and the actual levels of commissions and marketing — not the headline unit number.

5.2 Neither gross-only nor mixed is forced as the answer

Gross-only is simple and easy to explain, but aggressive. Mixed-recognition has precedent support but is unconfirmed in the 1Q26 footnotes. The central case therefore keeps reported revenue gross-leaning while applying conservative discounts to ASP and costs — the most defensible middle path.

5.3 Operating profit clears KRW 200B but KRW 225B is still the upper zone

Project aggressive base cases sit near KRW 223B; one external calculation reaches KRW 225.8B but drops to ~KRW 210B on risk adjustment. A pure conservative read of KRW 195.0B is not wrong, but lower-bound. The most defensible central value is near KRW 205B.

6. Sensitivity and framing

6.1 Defensive band

Zone	Revenue	OP	Interpretation
Conservative lower	KRW 385B	KRW 195B	Upper-risk rev-rec + marketing
Central case	KRW 395B	KRW 205B	External share baseline
Upper mid	KRW 400B	KRW 210B	Mixed view favorable
Aggressive upper	KRW 400–410B	KRW 220–225B	Gross-only + cost lower bound

“Base 1Q26 at KRW 395B revenue and KRW 205B OP as the central case, but treat the operating-profit range as KRW 195–225B until footnotes and actual cost lines are disclosed.”

That phrasing is the most defensible.

7. Open uncertainties

Not yet confirmed as facts — all to be resolved at the May earnings release / quarterly filing:

1Q26 principal/agent footnote treatment
Platform-level sold units
Actual refund rate
Actual marketing expense
Actual commission expense
March 31 cutoff recognized units

The current central case is the best-available midpoint before these six are published.

8. Final sentence

Pearl Abyss 1Q26 central case: revenue KRW 395.0B, operating profit KRW 205.0B, OPM 51.9%.

The figure is grounded in the two official Crimson Desert milestones (4M by April 1, 5M by April 15) and the 4Q25 cost structure, with conservative adjustments for accounting-frame uncertainty and marketing/commission opacity. It sits below the aggressive gross-only cases and above the most conservative mixed-recognition reads — the number that is currently the most explainable and the most defensible.