iComponent — Not a 'Display Materials Stock' but a 'Barrier Film Mix Turnaround + Perovskite Option Play'. What PER 6x Really Means

Tue, 19 May 2026 11:30:00 +0900

📚 Related Series Pamicell Supply-Demand Analysis / TLB SOCAMM Module PCB Analysis / SK Hynix AI Memory Architecture Shift / May 17 Market Overview

Bucketing iComponent as a ‘display parts stock’ gets the thesis wrong from the start. In 1Q26, revenue was ₩9.74B, with COATED PET (barrier coating film) at ₩8.06B — 82.8% of total. The company’s identity has already changed. FY2025 revenue of ₩34.65B (YoY -6.6%) produced operating profit of ₩6.04B (+132.6%) and OPM of 17.4% — a clear mix-improvement signal where profits surged despite falling sales. Market cap ~₩42.1B, TTM PER ~6.0x. On raw numbers alone, this is obvious undervaluation. The core question is whether ‘COATED PET at 80% mix + OPM in the 17% range repeats in 2Q26.’

Key Summary

iComponent is a company that resists a single-keyword label. In the past it was a display parts stock centered on PC and PMMA optical films, but in 1Q26 COATED PET (barrier coating film) accounts for ₩8.06B — 82.8% of the ₩9.74B in total revenue. The implication is that the company’s identity has already been restructured into ‘barrier coating film + flexible electronic materials + next-generation solar cell option play.’

FY2025 results make this clearest. Revenue was ₩34.65B, down 6.6% YoY, yet operating profit was ₩6.04B, up 132.6%, with OPM of 17.4%. 1Q26 repeated the identical structure: revenue ₩9.74B, OP ₩1.66B, OPM 17.0%. A pattern in which profits surge even as revenue declines signals not a ‘simple cyclical recovery’ but a ‘structural shift in product mix.’

Market cap ~₩42.1B, TTM net income ~₩7.0B, TTM PER ~6.0x. PBR ~0.95x. On raw numbers alone, this is obvious undervaluation. Base scenario (2026E revenue ₩39.5B, OPM 17.5%, PER 7.5x applied) target price ₩7,500, +26.8% upside. Bull (PER 9x) ₩11,100 (+87.3%), Bear (OPM 15.5%, PER 6x) ₩5,000 (-15.7%).

However, four unverified variables exist. First, no formal sell-side target-price report within 90 days. Second, revenue breakdown by customer and product is undisclosed. Third, FX effects cannot be isolated from the 2025 profit improvement. Fourth, the direction of the treasury share disposal plan to be decided at the June 29 EGM (cancellation vs. disposal).

The real option value lies in expansion across four application layers: ESL/e-paper, perovskite/flexible solar cells, flexible OLED substrates, and battery/energy devices — the areas where business purposes will be added at the June 29 EGM. Whether those added purposes translate into actual revenue is the binary test.

Verdict: Watchlist → Conditional Buy. First entry at ₩5,400–5,700 on pullback or after closing above ₩6,150, with full conviction entry after 2Q26 confirms revenue ₩10B+, OPM 17%+, and COATED PET mix at 80%+. It belongs in the same category as the Pamicell thesis — a ‘small-cap materials reclassification gap’ — but market cap, liquidity, and coverage are all smaller, making it more volatile.

1. The Fundamental Shift in Corporate Identity

Bucketing iComponent as a ‘display parts stock’ means the first button is already misaligned. In 2020, PC and PMMA each accounted for 31.9% and 32.2% respectively, making it an optical film company where those two products covered over 64% of revenue. As of 1Q26, PC LGP Film is 8.6% and PMMA is 3.7% — combined just 12.3%. Meanwhile COATED(PET) has exceeded 80%. In under five years, the revenue composition has been completely inverted.

Product	1Q26 Revenue	Mix	Primary Use
COATED(PET)	₩8.057B	82.8%	Barrier film, ESL/e-paper, flexible solar cells
PC LGP Film	₩0.839B	8.6%	Light guide plates, optical film
COATED(PC/PMMA)	₩0.427B	4.4%	Functional coating film
PMMA	₩0.362B	3.7%	Optical / display materials

Understanding what COATED(PET) is forms the starting point of the thesis. The name is simple, but the substance is a ‘functional barrier film that blocks moisture and oxygen.’ Next-generation electronics like OLEDs, e-paper, and perovskite solar cells offer thin, lightweight, and flexible advantages, but are vulnerable to moisture and oxygen. A transparent shield is needed to protect the sensitive electronic materials inside from the external environment — that is a barrier film.

The legacy PC/PMMA optical film business is captive to the display cycle and faces heavy Chinese low-cost competition pressure. In the 1Q26 report, the company cited softening demand for extruded film and competitive pricing pressure from Chinese manufacturers. That is, the legacy business faces a structural headwind — and that is precisely why 2025 revenue fell 6.6%.

By contrast, the rising COATED PET mix has pulled margins higher. OPM jumped from 7.0% in 2024 to 17.4% in 2025, a swing of over 10 percentage points. A structure in which an OPM surge overwhelms a revenue decline is a clear ‘mix-improvement signal.’

2. 1Q26 Results — What a Repeat 17% OPM Means

1Q26 results suggest that the structural shift seen in 2025 is not temporary. Revenue ₩9.74B (YoY +42.7%), operating profit ₩1.66B (YoY +249.4%), net income ₩1.96B, OPM 17.0%. This is nearly identical to the full-year 2025 OPM of 17.4%.

Period	Revenue	Operating Profit	OPM	Notes
2023	₩27.34B	-₩2.14B	-7.8%	Cycle / mix deterioration
2024	₩37.09B	₩2.59B	7.0%	Recovery
2025	₩34.65B	₩6.04B	17.4%	Revenue decline + profit surge
1Q26	₩9.74B	₩1.66B	17.0%	Structural confirmation

Cross-check: 2025 OPM = ₩6.04B / ₩34.65B = 17.4%; 1Q26 OPM = ₩1.66B / ₩9.74B = 17.0%. Simple annualization (1Q26 × 4) gives revenue ₩38.96B and operating profit ₩6.64B, both above 2025 levels.

Why this matters: the probability that ‘17% OPM is structural rather than one-time’ is steadily rising. If FX effects or one-time project revenue were the primary cause, we would have seen meaningful swings between quarters. The fact that FY2025 and 1Q26 showed OPM at similar levels is circumstantial evidence that the product-mix change is real.

The definitive verification, however, is 2Q26 results. If 2Q26 also repeats revenue ₩10B+ and OPM 17%+, the thesis gains full confirmation. Conversely, if OPM retreats to the 13–14% range, the interpretation solidifies that much of the 2025–1Q26 strong results were driven by FX and one-time variables.

The company cited both ‘increased optical film product sales and KRW depreciation’ as factors behind the 2025 operating profit improvement. The inability to fully isolate the FX effect is the largest unverified variable in the thesis. If KRW appreciates, a portion of 2025–1Q26 profits could be given back.

3. Valuation — What PER 6x Really Means

As of 11:01 KST on May 19, share price ₩5,950, shares outstanding 7,071K, market cap ~₩42.1B. Excluding treasury shares of 611,620, the EPS-denominator share count is 6,459K.

Based on trailing four quarters (2025Q2–2026Q1) combined net income of ~₩7.00B:

TTM PER = Market cap ₩42.07B / TTM net income ₩7.00B = 6.0x
PBR = Market cap ₩42.07B / 2025 total equity ₩44.48B = 0.95x

Rounded to one decimal place. Clearly in undervaluation territory. Below half the KOSPI/KOSDAQ average PER, and a PBR below 1.0x means trading below asset value.

Target prices across three scenarios:

Scenario	2026E Revenue	OPM	Operating Profit	Net Income	EPS	PER Applied	Target Price	Upside
Bear	₩36.5B	15.5%	₩5.66B	₩5.4B	₩836	6.0x	₩5,000	-15.7%
Base	₩39.5B	17.5%	₩6.91B	₩6.5B	₩1,006	7.5x	₩7,500	+26.8%
Bull	₩43.0B	20.0%	₩8.60B	₩8.0B	₩1,239	9.0x	₩11,100	+87.3%

P/B cross-check is consistent. Estimated 2026 year-end equity ~₩49.8B (= 2025 ₩44.48B + 2026E net income ₩6.5B − dividend ₩0.97B). BPS = ₩49.8B / 7,071K shares = ~₩7,053. Applying PBR 1.0–1.1x yields ₩7,050–7,760, nearly identical to the PER-method Base of ₩7,500.

The interpretation has two branches. PER 6x is either a signal that the market views the 17% OPM as one-time, or a signal that the market has not yet recognized the company’s identity change. Either way, 2Q26 results are the binary test for the thesis.

One important criticism deserves mention here. There is no formal sell-side target-price report within 90 days. The most recent report shown on the consensus page is a 2023 IBK note. With a market cap of ₩42.1B and daily average turnover of ~₩1.13B, institutional coverage is effectively absent. This is double-edged: on one hand it is a signal that the market does not know this company, a potential source of alpha; on the other, weak price-discovery mechanisms mean results may take longer to be reflected in price.

4. Four Application Layers — Where the Real Option Value Lies

The value of barrier coating film lies in simultaneous applicability across multiple next-generation electronics, not in a single end market. Organizing the four application layers the company presents by their probability and timing of revenue realization reveals that each is different.

ESL/e-paper — the most realistic revenue base. Electronic shelf labels (ESL) and electronic paper (e-paper) are low-power, thin, lightweight displays spreading rapidly in retail, logistics, and industrial environments. Leading global ESL player VusionGroup posted 1Q26 revenue of €289M (YoY +34%) with a 2026 full-year growth guidance of +15–20%, serving 350+ large retailer customers and a 650M+ ESL installation base. Per iComponent IR materials, ESL/e-paper panel companies are cited among major customers, making it likely that a significant portion of COATED PET revenue comes from this segment. However, since customer names and per-customer revenue are undisclosed, the exact share cannot be estimated.

Perovskite / flexible solar cells — the single strongest catalyst. In 2024, the company signed an ₩8.2B barrier film supply contract with a leading European flexible solar cell company — equivalent to 23.28% of the prior year’s revenue, large for a single contract. Interview-based coverage also mentions supply to global perovskite/solar-related companies in the US, Europe, Japan, and China. The reason perovskite matters is simple: conventional silicon solar panels are heavy and rigid, but perovskite-based flexible solar cells can be affixed to building facades, car roofs, drones, satellites, and wearables. If this market genuinely opens up, high-performance film rather than glass will be needed — and iComponent is a direct beneficiary. However, the timeline for perovskite commercialization and durability validation remains an open variable.

Flexible OLED / smartphones / TVs — potential large-scale option. The company cites TVs, flexible smartphones, and flexible OLED substrates as applications for its barrier coating technology. Mass-production adoption by customers, however, is still unconfirmed. If meaningful share in the flexible OLED substrate encapsulation market is secured, revenue could step up to a new level. Competitive variables include UTG (Ultra-Thin Glass) and inorganic thin-film encapsulation as alternative technologies. This segment is best treated as a long-term option with Low–Medium conviction.

Battery / energy devices — new entry territory. The June 29, 2026 EGM agenda includes flexible energy devices, flexible display dedicated components, perovskite/solar cell dedicated components, ESL/e-paper components, battery/energy device components, and nano-scale roll-to-roll materials as new business purposes. This signals the company’s intent to extend its barrier film technology into energy and flexible electronic materials. However, adding a business purpose is merely a charter amendment; whether it translates into actual revenue and orders is the key. Historical precedents show that charter additions often end as simple housekeeping.

Synthesizing these four layers reveals the true depth of the thesis. The market views iComponent as a ‘small-cap optical film stock,’ but the actual profit structure is closer to an ‘option platform manufacturing barrier shields for multiple next-generation electronics.’ The applications differ in timing and intensity, which is why they resist a single category label.

5. Four Unverified Variables — Starting Points for Invalidation

As attractive as the thesis is, unverified variables are clearly present. Laying out four of them reveals the starting points for invalidation.

First, customer and product revenue breakdown is undisclosed. Within the ₩8.06B of COATED PET revenue, it is impossible to decompose how much is from ESL, how much from flexible solar cells, or whether OLED-related revenue actually exists. A structure where a single ₩8.2B supply contract represents 23% of annual revenue means single-customer, single-project risk is high. Sudden revenue volatility could appear in quarterly results.

Second, FX effects cannot be isolated. The company cited both increased optical film product sales and KRW depreciation as factors behind the 2025 operating profit improvement. In other words, some of the 2025 OPM of 17.4% reflects FX. Exactly how much is not disclosed. The fact that 1Q26 repeated OPM at 17.0% is circumstantial evidence against FX being the only cause, but in a scenario where KRW enters the ₩1,300s, some profit give-back should be anticipated.

Third, the June 29 EGM treasury share disposal plan. How the 611,620 treasury shares (~8.6% of total) will be handled is a significant variable. Cancellation means EPS +8.6% and a shareholder-return signal — a multiple expansion factor. Employee compensation or third-party disposal means overhang/dilution risk — a multiple contraction factor. The disclosure after June 29 is a binary signal.

Fourth, execution verification for new business purposes. Whether the four areas being added at the June 29 EGM (flexible energy devices, perovskite dedicated components, ESL/e-paper components, battery/energy device components, roll-to-roll materials) translate into actual revenue is the core of the medium-term thesis. If it ends as a simple charter addition, the market will interpret it as a ’thematic disclosure’ and momentum will fade.

Invalidation conditions can be defined clearly. 2Q26 revenue below ₩9.0B or OPM at or below 14%; COATED PET mix falling below 70%; treasury share disposal interpreted as overhang; new business purposes yielding no material revenue within one year; acceleration of entry by global materials companies (3M, Mitsubishi, etc.) into the high-end barrier market. If two or more of these are met, the thesis warrants re-evaluation.

6. Entry Guide — Chasing Is Inefficient, Scale-In Is the Answer

Verdict: Watchlist → Conditional Buy. As of 11:01 KST on May 19, trading up +5.5% at ₩5,950, with an intraday range of ₩5,540–6,150. Short-term momentum is present, making chasing inefficient. Yet an ultra-small-cap at ₩42.1B market cap has thin volume — once momentum builds it moves quickly, and when it falls it falls faster. A scale-in approach is essential.

Price Range	Action	Condition
₩5,400–5,700	First tranche buy	Partial macro gate passage
₩5,700–5,950	Hold OK, no new entry	Current range
Break above ₩6,150 + volume confirmation	Consider trend re-entry	After closing above
₩7,000–7,500 reached	Partial Base target profit-taking	Before 2Q26 confirmation
₩7,500–8,500 reached	Additional profit-taking	After Bull scenario entry confirmed
₩11,000 reached	Bull target achieved, active exit	Application expansion + FX tailwind simultaneous

Stop-loss: reduce position on break below ₩5,000; thesis weakens on break below ₩4,500 + 2Q26 OPM below 14%.

Full-conviction entry conditions are clear. 2Q26 revenue ₩10B+, OPM 17%+, COATED PET revenue ₩6.5B+ with mix maintained at 80%. When all four conditions are met simultaneously, the multiple-expansion thesis engages fully. The Bull target of ₩11,100 is only achievable when those four conditions combine with perovskite new supply contracts and a June 29 treasury share cancellation decision.

The seven macro gates from the May 17 market overview post are also preconditions. An ultra-small-cap at ₩42.1B market cap is the most vulnerable to macro shocks. In Scenario C (additional risk-off, 15–20% probability), a -20%+ correction is possible on retail flows alone without any foreign selling. Entering after confirming three to four macro gates is therefore rational.

7. Position in the Series — A New Category Called ‘Small-Cap Materials Reclassification Gap’

Clarifying where this post fits within the series sharpens the thesis comparison. It belongs in the same ‘reclassification gap’ category as Pamicell, but with a different mechanism.

Axis	Pamicell	iComponent
Market Cap	~₩1T	~₩42.1B
1Q26 Revenue	₩36.7B	₩9.74B
1Q26 OPM	35.6%	17.0%
Core Product Mix	Low-k materials 71%	COATED PET 82.8%
Market Reclassification Gap	Bio → AI CCL upstream	Display → Barrier / Perovskite
Coverage	Some (DS)	Effectively none
Volatility	Medium	High
Real Trigger	2Q26 results + supply-demand reclassification	2Q26 results + June 29 EGM

Both companies are small-cap materials names where ‘a market reclassification could expand multiples by a step.’ However, iComponent has a smaller market cap, less liquidity, and less coverage, making it more volatile. Even within the same thesis, position sizing should differ.

In comparison with TLB and Samsung Electro-Mechanics, the categories are different. TLB and Samsung Electro-Mechanics sit on the ‘AI memory architecture change’ spine of the series, while iComponent expands the series’ periphery into the ‘flexible electronic materials + perovskite option’ space. It operates on a separate track from the AI memory thesis, but both are part of the broader ‘Korean materials reclassification’ theme.

Connecting more concretely to other posts: the seven macro gates from the May 17 market overview are the common preconditions for all new entries. The SK Hynix Tech Note’s ‘memory architecture change thesis’ is an unrelated domain, so iComponent provides portfolio diversification. When AI memory names are shaken by macro shocks, iComponent responds to different variables (perovskite, FX, treasury shares), meaning correlation is likely low.

8. Red Team — The Strongest Counter-Arguments

Where is this thesis weakest? Laying out strong counter-arguments honestly:

Macro failure mode. If KRW appreciates, the FX tailwind — which the company explicitly cited as a factor in the 2025 operating profit improvement — weakens. Given that the company specifically noted KRW depreciation as a driver, if KRW enters the ₩1,300s, OPM could retreat to the 14–15% range. When the May 17 market overview’s macro gate (KRW/USD 1,500 break) is cleared, it is short-term favorable for KOSPI recovery, but for iComponent specifically, one must simultaneously consider the possibility of FX effect give-back.

Micro failure mode 1. Customer and product concentration risk is high. COATED PET at 82.8% of 1Q26 mix is a strength, but simultaneously means results could swing sharply with order timing from specific product categories. There is prior precedent of short-term result volatility from ESL value chain production disruptions or customer order delays. A structure where a single ₩8.2B supply contract accounts for 23% of annual revenue creates very high result volatility upon contract completion or delay.

Micro failure mode 2. Global materials company entry risk. If global materials players like 3M, Mitsubishi, or Toray make a full push into the high-end barrier market, iComponent’s advantage could erode quickly. This is the most common failure mode for Korean small/mid-cap materials companies. The company’s moat is ’early entry + customer qualification + mass-production know-how’ rather than permanent monopoly, meaning it could weaken over time.

Perovskite commercialization delay risk. Perovskite solar cells have been validated on efficiency but still face issues with durability, longevity, and manufacturability. If perovskite commercialization slips to 2027–2028, iComponent’s perovskite option value is delayed alongside it.

Liquidity / volatility risk. At ₩42.1B market cap and daily average turnover of ~₩1.13B, institutional buying is difficult to sustain, and once price falls, selling pressure accumulates quickly. A -30%+ correction is possible if macro Scenario C materializes. Position sizing must reflect a volatility tolerance higher than that of the average investor.

Treasury share disposal overhang risk. If the 611,620 treasury shares are distributed to employees or sold to a third party, an overhang of roughly ₩3.6B (₩5,950 × 611,620 shares) could hit the market in the short term. If the June 29 EGM resolution is unfavorable, a near-term -10–15% correction is possible.

Synthesizing these six risks makes clear that this is not a ‘stable blue-chip stock’ but a ‘small-cap materials name with option value embedded in high volatility.’ That must be reflected in position sizing.

9. Frequently Asked Questions

“Isn’t PER 6x an automatic buy?”

Making a buy decision on PER 6x alone would be a mistake. There is a reason the market assigns PER 6x. Skepticism over the sustainability of 17% OPM, customer concentration risk, inability to isolate FX effects, and absence of formal coverage within 90 days — four variables operating simultaneously. Even the Base PER of 7.5x (target ₩7,500) rests on the assumption that 2Q26 results repeat the 1Q26 level. If that assumption breaks, PER reverts to 6x or lower. PER 6x is a price that simultaneously reflects both ‘undervaluation signal’ and ‘market skepticism.’

“Compared to Pamicell, which is more attractive?”

They operate on different dimensions. Pamicell has a market cap of ~₩1T and OPM in the 35% range — higher stability, but multiple expansion upside of roughly +55%. iComponent at ₩42.1B market cap carries higher volatility but offers +87% in the Bull scenario. Risk-reward asymmetry is more pronounced, but so is the risk asymmetry itself. From a portfolio diversification standpoint, holding both may be rational. However, given that the market cap difference is 23x, position sizing should differ accordingly.

“Is the June 29 EGM really that important?”

Three things are decided simultaneously, which makes it important. First, the direction of 611,620 treasury shares (8.6% of total): cancellation means EPS +8.6% plus shareholder-return signaling — a multiple expansion factor; disposal creates overhang concerns — a multiple contraction factor. Second, the new business purpose agenda: if flexible energy devices, perovskite dedicated components, ESL/e-paper components, and roll-to-roll materials are formally added to the corporate scope, the company’s identity officially shifts from ‘optical film company’ to ‘flexible electronic materials platform.’ Third, the shareholder return / capital allocation signal. This is the inflection point for how the market classifies this company. Depending on June 29 outcomes, short-term price volatility could range from -15% to +20%.

“If perovskite fails, what happens to the thesis?”

Perovskite is one of four application layers. Even if it fails, ESL/e-paper and flexible OLED applications remain. However, since perovskite was the single largest option value, failure removes the Bull scenario of ₩11,100 and makes the Base of ₩7,500 the new ceiling. Perovskite commercialization delay itself affects the 2027–2028 option value; it does not entirely collapse the near-term thesis.

10. Final Line

Bucketing iComponent as a ‘display parts stock’ gets the thesis wrong. The accurate identity is ‘a flexible electronic materials + next-generation solar cell option platform restructured around COATED PET barrier coating film.’ The fact that COATED PET accounts for 82.8% of 1Q26 revenue of ₩9.74B is the evidence.

That revenue fell 6.6% in 2025 yet operating profit surged 132.6% and OPM jumped from 7.0% to 17.4% is not the result of a simple cyclical recovery, but of a structural product-mix change. The repeat of 17.0% OPM in 1Q26 strengthens this. Market cap ₩42.1B and TTM PER ~6.0x are obvious undervaluation on raw numbers alone, but there are clear reasons the market assigns this price: skepticism over the sustainability of 17% OPM, customer concentration risk, inability to isolate FX effects, and absence of formal coverage within 90 days.

The real option value lies in expansion across four application layers: ESL/e-paper (most realistic revenue), perovskite/flexible solar cells (2024 European ₩8.2B supply contract, single largest catalyst), flexible OLED substrates (potential large-scale option), battery/energy devices (new entry). These are areas where business purposes will be added at the June 29 EGM, but whether a charter addition translates into actual revenue is the binary test.

Valuation scenarios are clear. Base ₩7,500 (+26.8%), Bull ₩11,100 (+87.3%), Bear ₩5,000 (-15.7%). PER method and P/B cross-check are nearly identical. Risk-reward asymmetry is attractive, but six risks (FX, customer concentration, global materials company entry, perovskite delay, liquidity volatility, treasury share overhang) operate simultaneously.

Verdict: Watchlist → Conditional Buy. First entry at ₩5,400–5,700 on pullback or after closing above ₩6,150; full-conviction entry after 2Q26 simultaneously confirms revenue ₩10B+ / OPM 17%+ / COATED PET mix maintained at 80% — three conditions together. The seven macro gates from the May 17 market overview post are also preconditions. An ultra-small-cap at ₩42.1B market cap is the most vulnerable to macro shocks.

Its position in the series is the same ‘small-cap materials reclassification gap’ category as Pamicell, but with a different mechanism: low-k materials vs. barrier film, market cap ₩1T vs. ₩42.1B, OPM 35% vs. 17%. Portfolio diversification by holding both is possible, but position weighting must be differentiated in line with market cap and volatility. It is an unrelated domain to the AI memory architecture thesis in the SK Hynix Tech Note, so correlation is low and it provides a hedge effect.

The core question is simple. Does 2Q26 repeat the 1Q26 pattern? Is the June 29 EGM treasury share decision a cancellation? Does a follow-on perovskite supply contract emerge? These three binary questions determine the thesis over the next six months. It is likely a good company. The good entry price is a pullback to ₩5,400–5,700. Chasing above ₩6,000 is inefficient. The true meaning of PER 6x is that it is a price where ’the possibility that the market has not yet priced in this company’s identity change’ and ‘rational skepticism about whether that change is real’ coexist.

This post is for research and commentary purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Performance, price, and supply-demand data are based on company disclosures, market data, and press reports and may vary by timing. Scenarios, target prices, and entry prices represent an analyst framework and are not guaranteed. 1Q26 product-level revenue is based on Investing.com reporting, not the original quarterly report; customer names, per-customer revenue, and isolated FX effect figures are not publicly disclosed. This analysis may be wrong. Data reference date: 2026-05-19 KST.

Barrier Film on Korea Invest Insights