Memory No Longer Needs Prices to Rise Further: Anatomy of the August 3 Plunge and the Contract Price Deceleration

Mon, 03 Aug 2026 18:40:00 +0900

Connected context: July Earnings Season Wrap: AI Demand Was Confirmed, and Memory Pricing Became an Industry-Wide Cost noted that memory prices had, for the first time, become a cost line item outside the memory companies themselves. Data showing that the pace of that price increase is slowing has become today’s market language. This piece dissects the August 3 plunge, sorts out what that data actually says and does not say, and lays out where this cycle’s investment question has moved.

TL;DR

On August 3, the KOSPI closed at 6,257.45, down 5.12%, while Samsung Electronics fell 8.76% and SK Hynix fell 8.79%, and the KOSDAQ actually rose 2.44%. [Fact: Exchange and media reports combined] Memory stocks gave back nearly twice what the index did, while small and mid caps rose. This asymmetry is the information of the day.
But the nature of this decline should not be misread. On the prior trading day, July 31, the KOSPI rose 17.91%, its largest single-day gain on record, and Samsung Electronics gained 26.81%, its own largest one-day gain ever. [Fact: Exchange] Compared with the July 29 close, Samsung Electronics is still 14.9% higher even after today’s plunge. Today’s 8.8% is not a new loss; it is a partial giveback of the surge from two days earlier.
The third-quarter DRAM contract price deceleration cited as the cause is not new data. It is a forecast that TrendForce published on July 3 and reaffirmed on July 9. [Fact: TrendForce] What is new today is not the data, but the market’s room to look at it.
Macro conditions created that room. Oil fell from $116 to $79 in late July, a joint yen-buying intervention that included the United States for the first time since 1998 was carried out on July 30 and 31, and the US 10-year yield came down to 4.68%. [Fact: Market data, Japan’s Ministry of Finance] Once the discount rate problem eased, the market immediately moved its question to the numerator, meaning how long the profits last.
Here is what the deceleration actually looks like. Quarterly contract price growth went from 90 to 95% in Q1, to 58 to 63% in Q2, and is now forecast at 13 to 18% for Q3. [Fact: TrendForce] Prices are still rising, but the pace of the rise has slowed for two straight quarters. The cause is not an increase in supply, but that PC and smartphone makers have reached the limit of what they can pay.
The contract structure has actually tilted toward suppliers. SK Hynix removed the price ceiling from its new long-term contracts, Samsung Electronics kept only a price floor and left 30 to 40% of volume for the spot market, and Micron set its price floor above its own highest margin from the previous cycle. [Fact: Reports and industry sources] The common assumption that buyers cap future price increases does not hold, at least for the two Korean suppliers.
The actual 2019 numbers define this cycle’s question. That year, DRAM bit demand grew about 19%, but as average selling prices fell 47.4%, revenue dropped 37.5%. [Fact: Gartner] Volume is not what generates memory profit; price is. That is why the fact that data centers are replacing consumer demand is not grounds for reassurance.
The conclusion is a change of thesis. The contest in this cycle has shifted to whether prices hold at current levels, not whether they rise further. If the market’s implied sustainability rate is 38 to 42%, merely holding steady leaves considerable room for re-rating. But margins in the 90% range have historically triggered capacity expansion, and holding steady will not happen on its own; it is an outcome that supply discipline has to produce.

Key Framing

Prices are still rising, the contract structure has shifted in suppliers’ favor, and inventory is not yet at down-cycle levels. Even so, the reason the market gave back twice as much in memory stocks is not that it doubts the size of the profits, but that it has started recalculating how long those profits will last. The fact that the growth rate has slowed for two consecutive quarters moved the cycle’s clock forward by one notch. But deceleration and decline are different things, and this cycle has a contract structure that did not exist before. The question investors need to answer is not whether prices rise further, but how long they hold at this level.

1. What Actually Happened on August 3

Start with the numbers. The KOSPI fell 338.00 points, or 5.12%, to close at 6,257.45, after slipping as far as 6,223.29 intraday, down 5.64% at the low. Samsung Electronics fell 23,000 won to 239,500 won, down 8.76%, and SK Hynix fell 151,000 won to 1,567,000 won, down 8.79%. On the flow side, retail investors net bought 4.6527tn won, while foreign investors net sold 2.8427tn won and institutions net sold 1.9475tn won. [Fact: Exchange and media reports combined]

Moves on 3 August 2026. The index fell 5.12% while the two memory makers dropped 8.8% and the KOSDAQ rose. The selling concentrated in large-cap memory rather than the whole market.

View as table

Name	Change
KOSDAQ	+2.44%
KOSPI	-5.12%
SOX index	-3.24%
Samsung Electronics	-8.76%
SK Hynix	-8.79%

What deserves attention here is the KOSDAQ. On the same day, the KOSDAQ rose 2.44% to 737.35, its second consecutive daily gain. [Fact: Exchange] That means this was not a day when the whole index collapsed; it was a day when large-cap semiconductor stocks alone were sold heavily. The contrast in the United States points the same way. On July 31, Micron closed down 5.90% at $823.03, while Nvidia rose 2.93% to $200.75 the same day. [Fact: Market data] With one day’s lag, the same pattern showed up in both Korea and the United States. It was memory that sold off, not AI broadly.

But there is a fact that must be considered alongside this decline. On the prior trading day, July 31, the KOSPI rose 17.91% to close at 6,595.45. That is the largest single-day percentage gain on record. Samsung Electronics rose 26.81% to 262,500 won, also its largest one-day gain ever, surpassing the 15% gain of December 2001, and SK Hynix rose to its upper price limit. Foreign investors net bought 7.2tn won that day, also a record. [Fact: Exchange and media reports combined]

Samsung across four sessions. It gave back its gains on results day, posted its largest ever single-day rise the next session, then returned part of it. The 3 August close is still 14.9% above 29 July.

View as table

Date	Close (KRW)	Note
29 July	208,500	before the surge
30 July	about 207,000	results day, about -0.7%
31 July	262,500	+26.81%, its largest ever
3 August	239,500	-8.76%

The picture changes once you line up the sequence. On July 30, Samsung Electronics reported record earnings, yet gave back all of an intraday 4.08% gain and closed down about 0.7%. Media outlets explicitly called this a sell-the-news reaction. [Fact: Media reports] The following trading day it surged 26.81%, and the day after that it gave back 8.76%. Comparing the July 29 close of 208,500 won with today’s close of 239,500 won, the stock is still 14.9% higher across the three days. Today’s plunge is not a new loss; it is a retracement of the largest surge on record. The reasons Korean media cited included profit-taking after the prior day’s surge, a string of executive share-disposal disclosures, and foreign selling in night futures. [Fact: Media reports]

If that is so, what needs explaining in today’s decline is not the retracement itself, but the excess: the fact that memory gave back twice as much as the index.

2. The Deceleration Data Is Not New

What is widely cited as the cause of today’s decline is the deceleration in the third-quarter DRAM contract price outlook. Let’s get the content right first. By TrendForce’s numbers, quarterly contract price growth for commodity DRAM was 90 to 95% in Q1 and 58 to 63% in Q2, with a Q3 forecast of 13 to 18%. Server DRAM (RDIMM) is forecast at the same 13 to 18%, and NAND at 10 to 15%. Only PC DRAM was revised upward, from 8 to 13% to 15 to 20%, on June 30. [Fact: TrendForce] Counterpoint independently forecasts Q3 DRAM at 10 to 20%, a range that overlaps. [Fact: Counterpoint, July 7]

Conventional DRAM contract price growth. Prices rise in all four quarters, but the pace of increase has broken twice. Q3 and Q4 are forecasts, and Q4 is the PC DRAM figure.

View as table

Quarter	QoQ growth	Status
Q1 2026	+90-95%	actual
Q2 2026	+58-63%	actual
Q3 2026	+13-18%	forecast
Q4 2026	+3-8% (PC DRAM)	forecast

But the publication date of this forecast matters. TrendForce put out these numbers on July 3 and reaffirmed them on July 9. [Fact: TrendForce] As of today, that data is a month old. And the deceleration did not start this quarter, either. The drop from 90 to 95% down to 58 to 63% was already one deceleration; the Q3 forecast is the second.

So what is new today is not the data. What is new is the market’s room to look at that data. Throughout July, the variable that dominated the market was the discount rate. The US-Iran conflict pushed oil above $116, the yen was pushed down to the 163 range, its weakest in 40 years, and the US 30-year yield climbed to its highest level since 2007. All three unwound at once in the last week of July. Oil fell for three straight days after the July 27 report of a halt in strikes, coming down to around $79, and on July 30 and 31 a joint yen-buying intervention that included the United States for the first time since 1998 was carried out, while the US 10-year yield settled at 4.68%. [Fact: Japan’s Ministry of Finance, market data]

Once the discount rate problem eases, what remains is the numerator. The market immediately shifted its attention to how long the profits will last, and the material it happened to have on hand was the month-old contract price forecast. That is the structure behind why memory alone fell twice as much today. It is not that new bad news arrived; it is that there was suddenly room to look at old data. [Inference: Own assessment]

This distinction matters in practice. If it were new bad news, the next piece of bad news would be what to wait for. But if it is a change in the question being asked, then every piece of data that comes out from here will be graded against that same question.

3. Why the Deceleration Happened: A Demand-Side Event, Not a Supply-Side One

The fact that the deceleration was not caused by oversupply defines the character of this cycle. TrendForce’s own language is clear. Record-high contract prices mean that customers in consumer markets like PCs and smartphones have hit the limit of what they can pay, and with contract prices already at record highs, slowing consumer demand has pushed price tolerance to its limit. The same report describes supply as still extremely tight. [Fact: TrendForce, July 3]

Traces of that pass-through are already visible in set prices. Dell raised PC prices 15 to 20%, and Lenovo has also flagged a January price increase. Gartner expects DRAM and SSD prices to rise about 130% in 2026, pushing up PC prices by 17% and smartphone prices by 13%. [Fact: Gartner, February 26] Budget Android makers have chosen to downgrade camera and display specifications to protect margins.

Here is one data point that runs counter to conventional wisdom. Third-quarter contract price growth for PC and mobile DRAM, at 15 to 20%, is actually higher than the 13 to 18% for server DRAM. That is the result of tighter consumer-side supply as suppliers shift capacity toward servers and HBM. [Fact: TrendForce] In other words, what has cooled on the consumer side is not the realized price, but the capacity to absorb it. The two-tier structure, where AI demand is strong and consumer demand is cooling, is real, but that structure is showing up in capacity allocation right now, not on the price tag.

One counterexample is worth recording. The chairman of Taiwanese module maker ADATA said in early July that suppliers had notified the company of Q3 price increases of 20 to 30% for DRAM and 35 to 40% for NAND. [Fact: Reports, July 8] The 13 to 18% figure applies to large contracts; smaller buyers with no bargaining power face much steeper increases. The deceleration is an industry-average story, not a story that applies to every transaction.

4. The Contract Structure Has Actually Tilted Toward Suppliers

A widespread interpretation holds that hyperscalers locked in volume through long-term contracts and capped future price increases in the process. Checking this against the record shows the picture differs by supplier, and for the two Korean suppliers, it is the opposite of what is assumed.

Supplier	Price Ceiling	Price Floor	Notes
SK Hynix	Removed in new contracts	Not clearly confirmed	About 10 customers, up to 5 years. During shortages, spot price gains feed into contract prices
Samsung Electronics	None	Capped at a maximum 5% quarterly decline	Only 60 to 70% of capacity allocated to long-term contracts; 30 to 40% held for the spot market
Micron	Retained	Retained	16 customers, cumulative $100bn guaranteed through 2030. Floor set above its own highest margin from the prior cycle

[Fact: TrendForce and media reports combined]

The fact that the three companies made different choices is itself informative. Micron chose to lock in both sides of the price to reduce volatility, while the two Korean suppliers chose to keep the upside open. In particular, Samsung Electronics keeping 30 to 40% of volume for the spot market is a choice not to give up excess profit during the upswing.

That said, buyer bargaining power has not disappeared entirely. TrendForce expects that starting in Q3, the main source of server DRAM price increases will shift to customers without long-term contracts and volume outside existing contracts. [Fact: TrendForce, July 9] Some US cloud providers’ contracts still constrain how much suppliers can raise prices. Combined with the ADATA example above, the picture becomes clear: this is a two-tier structure in which large buyers are protected and small buyers absorb the increases.

Historical context is worth noting too. In the past, the standard for long-term memory contracts was to commit to volume while resetting price every quarter. [Fact: Industry sources] The three-to-five-year contracts of 2026 break that standard, and some even include a structure where 10 to 30% of the contract value is paid upfront. HBM has always been priced on an annual basis set in advance, so it moves independently of commodity prices. As a result, 2026 even saw a reversal in which DDR4 spot prices exceeded HBM3E contract prices. [Fact: Reports]

5. Volume Is Not the Issue; Price Is What Makes the Profit

A common objection needs to be addressed here: even if consumer demand falls, isn’t it fine because data centers are more than making up for it? On volume alone, this objection is correct. Server DRAM already overtook mobile as the largest demand source by bit shipments in 2023 (37.6% versus 36.8%), and HBM consumed 23% of total DRAM wafer input as of April 2026. [Fact: TrendForce] One AI server contains as much DRAM as hundreds of smartphones.

But in memory, what drives the swing in profit is not volume; it is price. 2019 shows this.

Volume and price in 2019. Bit shipments grew by nearly 19%, yet a 47% fall in price cut revenue by 37.5%. Bit shipments are back-solved from the revenue and price changes.

View as table

Measure	2019, year on year
Bit shipments	about +18.8% (back-solved)
Average selling price	-47.4%
DRAM revenue	-37.5%

In 2019, the average DRAM selling price fell 47.4% and revenue fell 37.5%. Working backward from those two figures, bit shipments grew about 19%. [Fact: Gartner, January 2020] Volume grew by nearly 20% while more than a third of revenue evaporated. The fact that Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix both guided to 20 to 21% shipment growth that year supports this back-calculation.

Bit volume grows even in down cycles. The one real exception is 2016, when shipments fell 3% and price fell 16%, shrinking the market 19%. [Fact: Industry compilations] In every other downturn, bits kept growing and profit kept following price. The idea that rising volume makes things fine has never held up in memory industry history.

So what does this shift in demand mix actually mean? Two effects pull in opposite directions. On the side that pushes prices up, hundreds of dispersed consumer buyers have played the role of bidding up marginal prices, and that pressure disappears once they hit their payment limit. What remains is a small number of large buyers, and they sit at the negotiating table. On the side that supports prices, the larger the volume locked into contracts, the narrower the path by which a spot price crash spreads into earnings, and because data center demand keeps replacing and expanding equipment even in down cycles, a 2019-style demand cliff becomes shallower.

Combine the two forces and they point in one direction: peak margins get lower and trough margins get higher. That is the judgment on where this mix shift ultimately lands, a third answer that is neither collapse nor permanence. [Inference: Own assessment] The memory subscription service concept that SK Hynix Chairman Chey Tae-won raised at the Nasdaq listing event on July 10 targets the same problem. The idea is to remove the cycle from the business structure rather than try to predict it. He himself stated it is still just an idea at this stage. [Fact: Reports, July 10]

6. What Is the Same and What Is Different From 2017-18

The precedent invoked most often for a deceleration phase is the previous major cycle. Contract price growth started slowing after the fourth quarter of 2017. In the first quarter of 2018, the month-over-month increase in PC DRAM slowed to 5%, and by the third quarter it had come down to 1 to 2%, marking the end of nine consecutive quarters of increases. Prices did not actually start falling until the fourth quarter of 2018, and within that quarter, contract prices were even cut twice. [Fact: TrendForce]

Stock prices moved earlier than that. Samsung Electronics hit its first peak on November 1, 2017, and SK Hynix on October 11, 2017; SK Hynix then corrected 27%, rebounded, and set its final peak on May 23, 2018. Both companies’ operating profit peaked in the third quarter of 2018. [Fact: Reports and disclosures] The commonly cited summary that “stock prices led by six months” is not accurate. Measured from the first peak, the lead was 9 to 11 months; measured from the final peak, it was 2 to 4 months. Stock prices at the time formed a double top, not a single peak. Micron shows the scale of the decline: it fell 56%, from $64 in May 2018 to $28 in December, consistent with the typical 50 to 60% peak-to-trough range for memory cycles. [Fact: Market data]

But this cycle has three things that did not exist back then. One is the contract structure discussed above: more than half of capacity is locked into multi-year contracts, with upfront payments involved. Another is the starting valuation. In 2018, the downturn began from peak multiples, but the sustainability rate the market is currently implying is 38 to 42%, a level that already prices in only a replacement-demand floor. [Inference: Own back-calculation] The last is the absolute level of margins. SK Hynix’s DRAM gross margin is estimated at 90.9%, and Micron’s contract floor is set above its own highest margin from the prior cycle. [Fact: Bernstein estimate, industry sources]

But that last item is both a shield and a risk. Margins in the 90% range have historically been the level that invites capacity expansion.

7. Holding Steady Will Not Happen on Its Own

Translating the discussion above into an investment judgment, the conclusion is a change of thesis. The contest in this cycle is not whether prices rise further, but whether they hold at current levels. An implied sustainability rate of 38 to 42% means the current stock price already assumes that only around 40% of peak profit remains. If that is the case, then even if prices simply hold without rising further, that assumption turns out to be significantly too conservative, opening room for re-rating. Holding steady is not a passive scenario; it is a bullish scenario relative to the current stock price. [Inference: Own back-calculation, sensitive to the sustainability rate assumption]

Two caveats attach to this, though. Commodity prices dislike sitting on a plateau and tend to trend instead. And current margins are at a level that invites the strongest possible supply response. There is precedent. In the PC cycle from 1993 to 1996, gross margins above 50% drew roughly 50 new fab construction announcements in 1995 and 1996 alone, and that glut ended the cycle. [Fact: Industry analysis] The expansions announced so far are Samsung’s Pyeongtaek P5 (construction complete first half of 2027, production in the second half of 2028), SK Hynix’s Cheongju M15X (mid-2027) and Yongin phase 1 (first quarter of 2027), Micron’s Idaho fab (second half of 2027) and New York fab (after 2029), and CXMT’s roadmap for 500,000-plus wafers per month by 2028. [Fact: Company disclosures, reports] Since a fab takes 3 to 5 years from groundbreaking to production, this capacity will arrive all at once around 2028.

The inventory asymmetry. Customer inventory has reached the warning line, but supplier inventory is still lean and far from the levels that led past downturns. Bars show the midpoint of each range.

View as table

Measure	Level	Reading
Supplier inventory	3-5 weeks	flat since February, still tight
Customer inventory	7-9 weeks	up from 2-4 weeks at the start of the year
Usual warning line	8 weeks	industry convention
Pre-downturn level	10-15 weeks	not reached

So “holding steady would be enough” is true, but “it will hold steady” is a separate claim. The former is arithmetic; the latter is an outcome that supply discipline has to produce. And whether contracts can substitute for that discipline is this cycle’s experiment. If a contract guarantees a price floor, holding steady becomes a condition rather than a hope; if it only guarantees volume, price remains a hostage to supply and demand. As the table above showed, Samsung Electronics and Micron currently have floors, while SK Hynix’s floor is unconfirmed.

8. The Second Force on the Same Day: The Yen

Beyond memory-specific factors, there was also a currency backdrop to the August 3 decline. But the dates need to be precise here too.

The joint intervention carried out on July 30 and 31 was unusual in both scale and character. Japan’s Ministry of Finance officially confirmed on August 3 that it had bought yen jointly with the US Treasury, marking the first direct US participation in such an intervention in 28 years, since 1998. Reuters reported that Japan and Korea carried out the first publicly confirmed joint intervention. The estimated scale was about $53 to 59bn on July 30 and about $34bn on July 31. [Fact: Japan’s Ministry of Finance, Reuters, Bloomberg] The US Treasury Secretary said he would not hesitate to pursue further joint intervention.

As a result, USD/JPY fell from 163.75 on July 27 to 159.54 on July 30, a 2.36% move in a single day, and reached 156.80 on August 3. In other words, the sharp single-day yen appreciation of over 2% happened on July 30, and the move on August 3 was only 0.50%. [Fact: Market data] Explaining today’s decline by a yen surge does not match the timeline. That said, the pace of appreciation itself, about 4.2% from 163.75 to 156.80 over the week following the intervention, is a condition that increases pressure toward carry trade unwinding.

The Korean won moved in the same direction. It fell from 1,465.07 on July 27 to 1,423.92 on July 30, and closed at 1,428.73 on August 3. [Fact: Market data] Won strength is a necessary condition for foreign investor buying. Currency stabilization lies behind the shift from foreign investors net selling more than 12tn won between July 1 and 16 to net buying 7.2tn won in a single day on July 31.

Many observers compare this to August 5, 2024. Back then, the yen appreciated 6.15% in a week, the Nikkei fell more than 12% in a single day, and the KOSPI dropped more than 8% as well. Recovery took one to two weeks. [Fact: Market data] Current positioning looks lighter than it was then. Net short yen positions in Chicago futures markets stood at 152,000 contracts as of July 24, below the roughly 180,000 contracts seen just before August 2024. [Fact: Chicago Mercantile Exchange, media reports] Korean brokerages have also suggested that, unlike two years ago, the carry funds available to unwind have already largely dried up. That said, there are dissenting views, and the actual peak in positioning right before the intervention cannot be confirmed because of reporting lags.

One thing needs correcting here. The common belief that joint intervention goes hand in hand with a recovery in risk assets is not historically well established. The intervention that included the United States in June 1998 did not produce an immediate effect, and the yen kept weakening through that August. [Fact: Market historical records] It is true that the KOSPI posted its largest-ever gain right after this intervention, but easing tension from Iran and Microsoft’s earnings coincided in the same period, so the effect cannot be isolated to the intervention alone.

9. What to Watch, and What to Stop Watching

Contract price growth rates now carry less informational value. The deceleration has already become an established fact, and the forecast for the next quarter is already out. Here is a prioritized list of what to watch instead.

Indicator	Current Value	Reading
Customer-side channel inventory	7 to 9 weeks (2 to 4 weeks at start of year)	Approaching the 8-week warning line. Top-priority condition for a down-cycle transition
Supplier-side inventory	3 to 5 weeks, flat since February	Far from the 10 to 15 week level seen ahead of past downturns. This asymmetry is the key point
DRAM spot price	New high of $41.10 on July 21	Has not gone flat or fallen for two straight weeks since April. Has not turned yet
Q4 contract price outlook	PC DRAM at 3 to 8% (revised up from 0 to 5% at end of June)	Now in single digits. Server and NAND figures not yet available
Contract price terms	Samsung has a floor; SK removed its ceiling	Whether a floor exists is the contractual basis for the holding-steady scenario
Upfront payments (contract liabilities)	Absolute amounts undisclosed by either company	Mid-August quarterly reports will be the first confirmation window

[Fact: TrendForce and industry compilations, Blocked: Quarterly reports not yet filed]

It is true that customer-side inventory is approaching the warning line, but supplier inventory remains thin and spot prices keep hitting new highs. For deceleration to turn into a decline, all three of these need to point in the same direction, and right now only one of them does. Slowing and declining are different things, and the moment that distinction breaks down is the moment the verdict changes.

Finally, here are the conditions that would overturn this piece’s verdict. If supplier inventory rises into double-digit weeks, if spot prices fall for two or more consecutive weeks, or if the Q4 server DRAM contract price outlook comes in flat or lower, then this piece’s judgment that this is “deceleration, not decline” is void as of that point.

Stocks mentioned in this piece are illustrative examples for analysis and are not a recommendation to buy or sell any particular security. Responsibility for investment decisions and their outcomes rests with the investor. Contract price figures are forecasts from TrendForce and Counterpoint and may differ from finalized monthly figures, and the third- and fourth-quarter items are estimates that have not yet materialized. The implied sustainability rate of 38 to 42% is an in-house back-calculation, is sensitive to its assumptions, and does not allow for a definitive statement about the size of any re-rating room. Channel inventory and spot price figures are industry compilations and vary by data provider. SK Hynix’s DRAM gross margin of 90.9% is a brokerage estimate, not a disclosed figure. The pricing terms of long-term contracts are drawn from a combination of reports and industry sources; since the original contracts are not public, the details may differ by supplier, and neither company has disclosed the absolute amount of its contract liabilities. The attribution of causes behind today’s plunge and the yen’s contribution to it are qualitative judgments, not a quantitative decomposition. Prices and indicators are as of the closing prices on August 3, 2026.

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Memory No Longer Needs Prices to Rise Further: Anatomy of the August 3 Plunge and the Contract Price Deceleration

TL;DR

1. What Actually Happened on August 3

2. The Deceleration Data Is Not New

3. Why the Deceleration Happened: A Demand-Side Event, Not a Supply-Side One

4. The Contract Structure Has Actually Tilted Toward Suppliers

5. Volume Is Not the Issue; Price Is What Makes the Profit

6. What Is the Same and What Is Different From 2017-18

7. Holding Steady Will Not Happen on Its Own

8. The Second Force on the Same Day: The Yen

9. What to Watch, and What to Stop Watching

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